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Abstract
In his 1971’s Dynamic Models of Segregation paper, the economist Thomas C. Schelling
showed that a small preference for one’s neighbors to be of the same color could lead to total
segregation, even if total segregation does not correspond to individual preferences and to a
residential configuration maximizing the collective utility.
The present work is aimed at deepening the understanding of the properties of dynamic
models of segregation based on Schelling’s hypotheses. Its main contributions are (i) to offer
a comprehensive and up-to-date review of this family of models; (ii) to provide an analytical
solution to the most general form of this model under rather general assumptions; to the
best of our knowledge, such a solution did not exist so far; (iii) to analyse the effect of two
devices aimed at decreasing segregation in such a model.
Chapter one summarizes the ingredients of Schelling’s models. We show how the choices
of the agent’s utility function, of the neighborhood description and of the dynamical rule can
impact the outcome of a model. Based on the observation of simulations’ results, we find that
the neighborhood description does not have a qualitative impact. As regards the dynamical
rules, we show that the Logit Behavioral rule introduced in this literature by Young (1998);
Zhang (2004b) presents several advantages relatively to the Best Response rule.
Chapter two presents a general analytical solution to the model. To that aim, Schelling’s
model is recasted within the framework of evolutionary game theory, as previously done
by Young (1998); Zhang (2004b). This allows to define sufficient assumptions regarding
agents’ utility functions that permit predicting the final state of the system starting from any
configuration. This analytical resolution is then used to consider the outcomes of Schelling’s
utility function and of other utility functions previously used in this context.
Chapter three examines the effects of introducing coordination in the moving decisions.
This coordination is achieved through two different ways. We first impose different levels
of taxes proportional to the externality generated by each move of the agents. It is shown
that even a low level of tax is sufficient under certain circumstances to significantly reduce
segregation. We then investigate the effect of the introduction of a local coordination by vote
of co-proprietors, who are defined as the closest neighbors of each agent. It is shown that
even a small amount of coordination can break segregation
Keywords: segregation, Schelling, potential function, coordination, tax, vote.
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Introduction
Ethnic and immigrant residential segregation is a striking feature of most Western cities.
Extended measures of segregation have been provided recently for U.S metropolitan areas
by Cutler et al. (2008), Iceland & Scopilliti (2008) and Reardon et al. (2008). Cutler et al.
(2008) examine a range of potential determinants of immigrant segregation, among which
cultural traits of immigrants and xenophobic sentiment among U.S. natives. Card & Roth-
stein (2008) focus on social interactions in whites’ preferences. Their results for the 1970-2000
period show evidence of tipping-like behaviors: the rise of the minority share above a certain
threshold in a neighborhood leads to a further continuous decrease of the white population.
According to these measures, preferences of white families seem to be so that whites’ utility
in a neighborhood exhibits a sharp decrease beyond a certain minority share.
This exploration of the temporal paths of minority shares in neighborhoods is based on
the prediction of social interaction models that have been developed to understand segre-
gation. As soon as 1969, Schelling proposed a model aiming at formalizing the aggregate
consequences of individual preferences regarding the social environment (Schelling, 1969,
1978). The two basic ingredients of Schelling model (1971) are an individual utility function
that determines entirely the level of satisfaction enjoyed by an agent in a location and a
dynamical rule that drives agents’ location changes and therefore the evolution of the city
configuration. Using an inductive approach, Schelling showed that if the preferences consid-
ered are such that an environment of more than 50% of own-group agents is highly preferred
to a less than 50% of own-group environment, then the equilibrium configuration exhibits
high levels of segregation. Schelling’s 1971 paper (Dynamic models of segregation, Journal
of Mathematical Sociology) is widely known thanks to this apparently paradoxical effect:
mild individual preferences for own group neighbors lead to a complete segregation at the
global scale. However, a moment of reflexion suffices to understand that, given the highly
asymmetrical utility function, the model could hardly lead to an integrated environment.
Later research showed that even a peaked utility function, that is, a function achieving its
maximum for a 50%- 50% environment, can lead to a fully segregated equilibrium as soon as
this function is asymmetric - even in a city where the two groups are equally proportioned
(Zhang, 2004b; Pancs & Vriend, 2007; Barr & Tassier, 2007).
Criticizing the realism of Schelling’s model is straightforward : ignorance of institutional
causes of segregation, of income effects, of cities’ social structure . . . Anyway, the model
has become a favorite example in the modeling of social systems as the unintended macro-
level consequences of individual behavior, and Schelling’s 1971 paper is his most widely cited
publication (more than 400 as of 2009, May 5th). After years of relatively low citation records,
his paper accrues since 2003 around 40 citations per year, showing the renewed interest in his
model. It is interesting to notice that citations arise from widely different fields: economics
and sociology represent the two strongest contributors (40% of the total number of citations)
but computer science, mathematics and physics gather 24% of the citations.
This substantial scientific activity has lead to new insights: the robustness of Schelling’s
results towards different definitions of individual’s utilities and/or environment (Pancs &
Vriend, 2007; Fagiolo et al., 2007); a physical analogue of Schelling’s model (Vinkovic &
Kirman, 2006); the interpretation of the emergence of segregation patterns as the result of a
coordination problem (Zhang, 2004a,b). However, these explorations rely almost exclusively
3
on agent-based simulations.
Some research attempted at solving analytically Schelling’s model in order to provide
more general results concerning the consequences of individual preferences on segregation
levels (Mobius & Rosenblat, 2000; Pollicott & Weiss, 2001; Zhang, 2004a,b; Dokumaci &
Sandholm, 2007).
However, to the best of our knowledge, no general analytical framework exists to date
that could predict the global pattern emerging from a given utility function. Zhang’s con-
tribution (Zhang, 2004a,b) represents today the closest achievement in this direction. He
proposes a variation of Schelling’s model which he analyses formally using a game-theoretical
approach and long-range dynamics properties. Unfortunately, his derivation suffers from
several deficiencies : his calculations are limited to specific utility functions, and even more
important, Zhang (2004b) abandons Schelling’s individual rationality. Indeed, Zhang’s an-
alytical approach cannot deal with vacancies, which leads him to define a new dynamical
rule: individuals’ moves in the city occur when two agents agree on exchanging locations.
This context allows an analytical resolution of the model because it is possible to translate
each individual movement into the variation of an aggregate-level function that parallels the
segregation level.
In this paper, we propose a general analytical solution to Schelling’s model, i.e. an
analytical treatment that allows to calculate the global segregation pattern starting from
almost arbitrary individual utility functions.
Chapter one summarizes the ingredients of Schelling’s models. Chapter two presents the
general analytical solution, allowing to predict the global state of the system from the knowl-
edge of the individual utility functions. Chapter three examines the effects of introducing
coordination in the moving decisions, and shows that even a small amount of coordination
can break segregation.
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Chapter 1
General formalism
1.1 Basic setup
1.1.1 The city and the agents
Our artificial city is a two-dimensional NxN square lattice with periodic boundary condi-
tions, ie a torus containing N2 cells. Each cell corresponds to a dwelling unit, all of equal
quality. We suppose that a certain characteristic divides the population of this city in two
groups of households that we will refer to as red and green agents. Each location may thus
be occupied by a red agent, a green agent, or may be vacant. We denote by NV the number
of vacant cells, and by NR and NG the number of respectively red and green agents. All
these numbers are kept fixed over a simulation. The parameter N thus controls the size of
the city, the parameter v = NV /N2 its vacancy rate, and the fraction nR = NR/(NR +NG)
its composition.
We define a state x of the city as a N2-vector, each element of this vector labeling a cell
of the NxN lattice. Each state x thus represents a specific configuration of the city. We note
X the set of all possible configurations, the demographic parameters (N , v, nR) being fixed.
1.1.2 Neighborhoods
Since Schelling (1969)’s work, two ways of conceiving the neighborhood of an agent have
been developed and used in analytical and simulation models.
Bounded neighborhood models (Fig 1.1a) describe cities divided into geographical subunits
within which all agents are connected. The neighborhood of an agent is thus composed
entirely and exclusively of the locations present in the same subunit than his own. In the
following, when we refer to a bounded description model, we will implicitly assume that the
city is divided into blocks of similar size H + 1, where H is a fixed integer that corresponds
to the number of locations in an agent’s neighborhood. Fig 1.1a displays an example of a
city divided into square blocks, which corresponds to the kind of bounded neighborhoods we
use in simulations. Bounded neighborhoods are well adapted to models that try to capture
or reproduce the effects of the administrative divisions of real cities such as census areas or
school districts.
Continuous neighborhood models (Fig 1.1b) describe cities where the neighborhoods do
not correspond to a zoning at the city level, but are centered on the local perception of
each agent. In a continuous neighborhood description, one assumes that the neighborhood
of an agent is composed of the H nearest locations surrounding him. The H = 4 “Von
Neumann neighborhood” and the H = 8 “Moore neighborhood” that are displayed among
other examples on Fig 1.1.b are the most commonly used neighborhoods in agent-based
computational models.
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Figure 1.1: Different forms of neighborhood. Red, green and white squares denote respectively red
agents, green agents and vacant cells. a. Example of a bounded neighborhood in which the city is divided in
square blocks containing H+1 = 25 cells/locations; b. In the case of a continuous neighborhood description,
the neighborhood of an agent corresponds to his H nearest cells/locations. Around the agents marked in
yellow, we enlightened by the white frontiers a H = 4, a H = 8, a H = 24 and a H = 44 continuous
neighborhood. [If you printed this document in black and white, the red and green squares should appear
respectively in dark grey and soft grey.]
Note that since some locations remain empty, the size H of the neighborhood of an agent
can also be interpreted as the maximum number of neighbors an agent can have. We will
discuss in section 1.3.1 the impact of the neighborhood description on the forms of segregation
at the city scale. We will see that the global characteristics of our model remain qualitatively
independent of any specific definition of neighborhood, provided its size H is relatively small
compared to the sizeN2 of the city, in order to maintain the “local” property of neighborhood.
1.1.3 Agent’s utility function
Each agent computes his own level of satisfaction via a utility function which depends only
on his neighborhood composition. let us consider an agent whose neighborhood is composed
of R red agents, G green agents and V vacant cells. Since R + G + V = H, one needs two
independent parameters to describe the composition of the neighborhood of the agent. In
all generality, we can thus write the utility of an agent for example as a function of R and
G or as a function of the fraction s of the agent’s similar neighbors and V . Most models of
the literature assume for simplification that agents of a same group share the same utility
function. Hence, one only needs a utility function uR to describe the preference of the red
agents and a utility function uG to describe the preference of the green agents. Table 1.1
displays some possible choices of input variables for defining a utility function.
input variables (R,G) (S, V ) (s, V )
utility of a red agent uR(R,G) uR(S = R, V ) uR(s = R/(R+G), V )
utility of a green agent uG(R,G) uG(S = G,V ) uG(s = G/(R+G), V )
Table 1.1: Different possible ways of defining the agents’ utility functions.
It is easy to understand that a utility function can be defined up to an additive constant
depending on a reference situation but also up to a multiplicative constant depending on
the measure scale. A common choice in the literature is to take these constants such that a
zero utility level denotes a complete dissatisfaction of the agent and a utility of one denote
complete satisfaction. We will stick to that use in the following.
Most models presented in the literature use utility functions that only depend on the sole
parameter s. Hence they do not take into account the influence of the local vacancy rate, a
choice that can be justified a posteriori by the fact that the vacant cells are almost always
uniformly distributed when the system reach the equilibrium. Some of these functions are
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presented in Figure 1.2. The most commonly used utility function is Schelling’s stair-like
function which is equal to one if s is greater than a fixed threshold sthr, and equal to zero
otherwise (Figure 1.2.a). However, several critics have been made regarding the artifact
generated by these utility functions. For example, sthr = 0.5 leads to highly segregated con-
figurations in which the agents are all satisfied, although they would be equally content to
live in a 50− 50 neighborhood. In this case, while no agent strictly prefers segregation, it is
also true that no agent is against it: the apparition of segregation is thus not so surprising.
Hence came an urge to investigate less “binary” utility functions. Bruch & Mare (2006)
worked with monotonic increasing functions such as the linear one presented on Figure 1.2.b
which models agents that are happier as their neighborhood becomes more and more of their
own color. Zhang (2004b), Pancs & Vriend (2007) and Barr & Tassier (2007) worked with
functions presenting a maximum for s = 0.5 such as the asymmetrically peaked ones pre-
sented on Fig 1.2.c which models agents whose main preference is for mixed neighborhood
but who still prefer all-similar neighborhoods to all-dissimilar ones.
Figure 1.2: Different examples of utility functions presented in the literature. a. Schelling’s
utility function is a stair-like function for which u(s) = 0 for s < sthr and u(s) = 1 for s ≥ sthr; b. the
“linear” function corresponds to u(s) = s for 0 < s < 1; c. the “asymmetrically peaked” functions correspond
to u(s) = 2s for s < 0.5 and u(s) = m + 2(1 −m)s for s ≥ 0.5. They present a maximum for s = 0.5 but
contain an asymmetry in favor of similar neighborhood, this asymmetry being controlled by the parameter
m = u(1). For m = 0, the utility function is symmetrically peaked.
Few models in the literature present utility functions that depend on two variables. Zhang
(2004a) uses utility functions that can be written in terms of s and V , where the second vari-
able V is used to give to each location a price that depends on the local density. Zhang hence
builds a segregative model which incorporates a simple residential market.
From a sociological point of view, the origin of the agents’ utilities is essential. How do
they depend on social policies, history, culture, economy, etc... In this paper, we just accept
this individualistic definition of satisfaction and calculate its consequences.
1.1.4 Aggregate measures
In order to characterize a configuration on the global (city) scale, we need to introduce
aggregate measures. Let sk, k ∈ {1, ..NR+NG} be the fraction of agent k’s similar neighbors.
In order to characterize the global level of segregation, we introduce for each configuration x
the average fraction of same-type neighbors, or similarity :
s¯(x) =
1
NR +NG
∑
k
sk (1.1)
Similarity is a well-known measure of segregation that was already used by Schelling (1971).
However, the knowledge of s¯(x) may not be sufficient to determine if the level of segregation
of a given configuration is significantly high or low compared to a random configuration
with the same demographic parameters: a similarity of 0.8 would point out a high degree of
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segregation in a city with equally proportioned groups (nR = 0.5) but would be insignificant
in a city with disproportioned groups (nR = 0.9). To avoid this kind of problem, we define in
the spirit of Carrington & Troske (1997) the normalized index of similarity s∗ : X → [−1, 1]
by
s∗(x) =

s¯(x)− s¯random
1− s¯random if s¯(x) ≥ s¯random
s¯(x)− s¯random
s¯random
if s¯(x) < s¯random
(1.2)
where s¯random is the expected value of the similarity index s¯ implied by a random al-
location of the agents in the city. This value depends on the size N , vacancy rate v and
composition nR of the city and on the size H of a neighborhood. However, in the cases stud-
ied below, i.e. for nR = 0.5, v > 0, H ≥ 1, N  1, the value of s¯random is indistinguishable
from 0.5.
Figure 1.3: Some examples of configurations of the city, along with their s∗-values. For ordered configura-
tions such as a,c,d,e, the value of s∗ fluctuates with the precise location of the vacant cells. The neighborhood
size is H = 8 and the demographic parameters are fixed to (N = 20, v = 10%, nR = 0.5).
Fig 1.3 displays some examples of configurations along with their s∗-values. The reference
value s∗ = 0 corresponds to an average random configuration. Positive values of s∗ mean that
the agents have more similar neighborhoods than in the random case, and negative values
that their neighborhoods contain less similar neighbors than in an average random case. A
maximum value s∗ = 1 corresponds to the case where all the neighbors of all agents belong
to their own group. Practically, given the random fluctuations of the configurations, an abso-
lute deviation larger than 0.05 corresponds to configurations which deviate significantly from
the random configuration. Notice finally that the normalized similarity index cannot grasp
every aspects of the city configurations. Because of the random fluctuations, it can’t for
example make the difference between a ‘checkerboard’ (Figure 1.3 c) ordered configuration
and a random configuration (Figure 1.3 b) 1.
We also introduce notations in order to characterize the level of collective utility:
U(x) =
∑
k
uk (1.3)
U∗(x) =
1
NR +NG
U(x) (1.4)
where uk is the utility of agent k, U(x) denote the collective utility of a configuration x and
U∗(x) its normalized value.
1For a complete and detailed discussion on segregation indices (which are used, what properties should
they verify, etc...), see for example Massey & Denton (1988), Reardon & Firebaugh (2002), Reardon &
O’Sullivan (2004).
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1.2 Dynamic rules
The core of the kind of model we are dealing with is that agents are given opportunities
to move to increase their individual utilities. Once the static description of the model is
specified, one must add a dynamic rule that governs these moves. In the following, we will
impose that:
• At the first iteration, an initial configuration is randomly chosen.
• At each iteration, one agent and one vacant cell are picked at random.
• The picked agent then chooses to move in that vacant cell with a probability Pr{move}
that depends on the utility gain ∆u he would achieve if he was to move, this probability
still being to be specified.
Instead of assuming, as Schelling did, that the agents move to the nearest satisfactory
position (the idea being that the cost of moving increases with distance), we suppose here
that the distance between the current and envisaged locations of an agent does not intervene
in his deciding whether to move or not2.
We present in this section several possible ways of defining the probability Pr{move}
which are adapted from what exists in the literature. Our goal is to discuss their respective
degrees of realism but also their respective efficiency: we will see that the choice of the
probability Pr{move} can strongly change the analytical properties of a model, its sensibility
to the initial configuration or the nature of its final configurations.
1.2.1 Myopic best-response
Given the preferences, the behavioral assumption made by Schelling (1969, 1971, 1978) is
that of myopic best-responses (BR): an agent will decide to move if and only if it increases
his utility. Furthermore, the agents are supposed to have some inertia, which means that
an agent moves only to strictly increase his utility. The probability that the picked agent
chooses to move can thus be written as:
Pr{move} = 1 if ∆u > 0
Pr{move} = 0 otherwise
A variation on this kind of dynamic is to remove the inertia and to suppose that an agent
may sometimes take utility-neutral moves. The probability Pr{move} could in this case be
written as
Pr{move} = 1 if ∆u > 0
Pr{move} = 0.5 if ∆u = 0
Pr{move} = 0 otherwise
In the following, we refer to these two kind of dynamic rules respectively as ‘strict BR’ and
‘non-strict BR’.
In a study bearing on different utility functions, Pancs & Vriend (2007) show that strict
BR often leads to steady-states where no agent can find a vacant cell which would strictly im-
prove its utility, even if a large fraction of agents are still unsatisfied. The artificial city hence
quite often ends up being stuck in a “frozen” configuration. These steady-states hence con-
stitute Myopic Nash Equilibria (MNE), the term myopic being justified by the fact that the
unsatisfied stuck agents disregard the fact that taking a utility-neutral or a utility-decreasing
move at a given moment may allow them to reach later a better position than their current
one. This dynamic is neither realistic (since people include other criteria to decide whether
2This could be justified by assuming that the cost of moving for the largest possible distance is smaller
than any possible strictly positive difference in utility between two locations.
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moving or not) nor analytically convenient, since the appearance of frozen configurations
renders the final states of the system dependent on the initial states (see below, Figs 1.5 and
1.6). Furthermore, Singh et al. (2007) show that strict BR dynamics leads to scale-dependent
results because of blocking. With stair-like individual utility functions, they obtain complete
segregation for a small city, but only partial segregation as the size of the city increases.
Vinkovic & Kirman (2006) interpret the removal of the inertia as the introduction of
some ‘fluidity’ in the system. In practice, most of the inconvenience of the strict BR dynamic
disappear by removing the inertia, the system being then able to get out of most of the frozen
configurations. Non-strict BR dynamics are then less dependent of the initial states. But
Myopic Nash Equilibria, although less numerous under these hypotheses, still exist and in
theory the final outcomes may still depend on the initial state.
1.2.2 A better behavioral rule: the logit dynamical rule
The probability to move that we present here goes a little bit further than non-strict BR by
allowing utility-decreasing moves. We assume that the picked agent chooses to move to the
picked vacant cell with a probability:
Pr{move} = 1
1 + e−∆u/T
(1.5)
where T > 0 is a fixed parameter.
The scalar T can be interpreted as a measure of the level of noise in an agent’s decision.
Clearly, the probability for an agent to take a utility-decreasing move drops down as T → 0
and the described rule thus converges to the non-strict BR rule. For any finite T > 0, the
agents choose non-best replies with a non-zero probability, but actions that yield smaller
payoffs are chosen with smaller probability.
This kind of perturbed best-response dynamics has been developed in e.g. Anderson et al.
(1992) or Young (1998). Taken as a behavioral rule, the underlying logit choice function in
eq. 1.5 is rooted in the psychology literature (Thurstone, 1928). From the microeconomic
point of view, it can be given a justification in terms of a random-utility model (see appendix
A.1.1) where the random part in the utility function can be interpreted as a way to take into
account criteria other than the neighborhood composition such as the quality of the housing,
the proximity to one’s workplace or any other idiosyncratic amenity.
Beside being more realistic from a behavioral point of view, the logit rule also provides a
strong analytical framework to Schelling’s model. Obviously, it implies that the probability
that the state at the tth iteration xt is equal to a given state x only depends on the state at
the previous iteration xt−1:
Pr(xt = x|xt−1, . . . , x1, x0) = Pr(xt = x|xt−1) (1.6)
The dynamic rule thus yields a finite Markov process.
It is then easy to figure out that the Markov chain describing our system is irreducible
(since T > 0 each imaginable move has a non-zero probability to happen and it is thus
possible to get to any state from any state), aperiodic (given any state x and any integer k,
there is a non-zero probability that we return to state x in a multiple of k iterations) and
recurrent (given that we start in state x, the probability that we will never return to x is 0).
These three properties ensure that the probability to observe any state x after t iterations
starting from a state y converges toward a fixed limit independent of the starting state y as
t→∞.
In other words, for each set of parameters and dynamic rule, there exists a stationary
distribution
Π : x ∈ X → Π(x) ∈ [0, 1] ,
∑
x∈X
Π(x) = 1 (1.7)
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which gives the probability with which each state x will be observed in the long run.
Clearly, for T → ∞, the randomness introduced in the dynamical rule prevails and the
stationary distribution is just a constant. Similarly, for any finite T > 0, our dynamical
system (the city) is evolving toward an attractor composed of a subset A of X. It follows
that any measure M performed on the states space X - such as the global utility U - will
in the long run fluctuate around a mean valueM∞ =
∑
x∈A Π(x)M(x). These mean values
may depend on the amplitude of the noise T , but the amplitude of the fluctuations decreases
as T → 0. These intuitions are confirmed later.
In the following, we refer to two states x and y as immediately communicating states (ICS)
if we can switch from the state x to the state y by moving one single agent. We also note
∆xyu the variation of the utility of that agent induced by this particular move and PTxy the
probability to be in state y at a given iteration if the system was in state x at the previous
iteration. According to the dynamic rule presented in the previous section, one has:
PTxy = γ(1 + e
−∆xyu/T )−1 if x and y are ICS (1.8)
PTxy = 0 if x and y are not ICS (1.9)
where the parameter γ = 1/(NV (NR + NG)) = 1/(v(1 − v)N4) takes into account the
probability to pick the right agent and the right vacant cell that allow to pass from x to y.
PT thus corresponds to the probability transition matrix for a fixed T and the stationary
distribution Π is by definition the unique normalized function defined on X that verifies for
all x ∈ X ∑
y
PTyxΠ(y) = Π(x) (1.10)
let us insist on the the fact that, compared to the BR rules, the final states of the
system don’t depend here on the initial ones (which is, in terms of a model’s effectiveness,
highly convenient). The simulations we present in the next section fortunately show that the
outcomes generated by the BR and logit dynamic rule are in general rather close. This is
understandable, since we already pointed out that the limit T → 0 corresponds to a non-strict
BR dynamic rule. For low values of the noise T , a configuration corresponding to a MNE
in the BR dynamic should then have a relatively high probability to appear when using the
logit rule. This intuition can be confirmed by the following property:
Lemma 1
Let txy be the expected time for the system leaving the state x to reach the state y.
In the case when the stationary distribution Π is unique and well defined, the stationary
probability to observe a state x is related to the expected return time txx:
Π(x) = 1/txx
A proof of this lemma is reproduced in appendix A.1.2. It is pretty obvious that if x is a
configuration corresponding to a MNE in the BR dynamic, in the limit T → 0, the expected
return time txx converges towards low values. Lemma 1 thus ensures that the probability to
observe x in the long run is rather high.
1.3 Simulations
In order to get a better grasp of how a model following our prescriptions behaves, we present
in this section some simulation results.
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1.3.1 Impact of the neighborhood description
Let us consider the snapshots presented on Figure 1.4. They present typical final states which
have been obtained by running simulations using the logit dynamical rule and different util-
ity functions and which allow to compare results depending on the chosen neighborhood
description. It is noticeable that when global segregative patterns appear in the continu-
ous description, segregative patterns following block boundaries -“checkering”- appear in the
bounded description. Since there is no interaction between agents of different blocks, there is
no reason why blocks of same color should aggregate, and checkering thus corresponds in the
bounded description to the pattern of maximal segregation. In the same way, when simula-
tions are run with the symmetrically peaked utility function, mixed random configurations
are obtained in both bounded and continuous neighborhood description. On the basis on
these few observations, one can conjecture that the choice of a neighborhood description is
qualitatively not determinant on the outcome of the models regarding the segregation issues.
In appendix A.1.3, we present other simulation results which tend to prove that, when using
the logit dynamic rule, the outcome of the models are also qualitatively independent of the
neighborhood size H.
Figure 1.4: Typical stationary configurations obtained by simulations. The demographic parame-
ters are (N = 30, v = 10%, nR = 0.5). Neighborhood size is fixed to H = 8. Top panel. With a continuous
neighborhood description. Bottom panel. With a bounded neighborhood description. From left to right:
the agents compute their utility with some of the functions presented earlier (the stair-like function with
sthr = 0.5, the linear function, the symmetrically peaked function and the asymmetrically peaked function
with m = 0.5, all functions figured as pictograms on the top row). The simulation were run using the logit
dynamical rule with a level of noise T = 0.1.
1.3.2 Welfare versus segregation issues
The snapshots on Figure 1.4 also allow to compare results according to the chosen utility
function of the agents (for simplicity, we choose here cases where red and green agents share
the same utility function u(s)). In the cases of the stair-like and of the linear utility functions,
for which the agents have a preference for like-neighbors, large segregation patterns appear.
Note that while the utilities of almost all the agents are maximized within these configura-
tions, the fact that large segregation patterns appear in the case of the stair-like function is
not trivial: a lot of configurations presenting only local segregation patterns also maximize
the collective utility. In the case of the “symmetrically peaked” utility function, the system
converges toward randomly-organized mixed configurations which also maximize the utility
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Figure 1.5: Stair-like utility function. Stationary values of the normalized similarity index and of the
normalized collective utility obtained by simulating the move of agents whose utility is computed using a
stair-like function u(s) with a threshold sthr varying from 0 to 1. We used a H = 8 continuous neighborhood
description and the demographic parameters were fixed to (N = 30, v = 10%, nR = 0.5). Simulations are
started from random or segregated initial states.
of most agents. Finally, the case of the asymmetrically peaked function may be the most
intriguing: large segregative patterns appear although they absolutely do not maximize the
utility of most agents (most of them being stuck inside an homogeneous area with a utility
of 0.5).
In this case, one of the key element driving the segregation is the asymmetry of this
utility function, ie, the fact that even if the agents have a strict preference for mixity, they
still favor a large-majority status over a small-minority status. Another key element is the
fact that the agents take only selfish decisions. Actually, as argued by Zhang (2004b) and
Pancs & Vriend (2007), the reason why individual preferences for integrated environments
may lead to segregated configurations can be expressed in economic terms as the existence of
externalities. Indeed, location choice by an agent is only based on her own utility level, even
if it also affects her neighbors’ utility levels. In particular, with the asymmetrically peaked
utility function, a red (green) agent may move for example from a 49% red (green) neighbor-
hood to a 51% red (green) neighborhood because it slightly increases her utility. Meanwhile,
this move is likely to decrease the utility of the agents in the initial and final moving agent’s
neighborhoods and therefore decrease the collective utility level. Both of these factors imply
that a highly-segregated configuration is necessarily very stable. Indeed, once the city is
divided into homogeneous areas, a red agent will have no incentive to go from the red area
to the green one (his utility dropping from 0.5 to 0)3.
1.3.3 Dynamical issues
Figures 1.5 and 1.6 display stationary values of the normalized similarity index and of the nor-
malized collective utility obtained by simulating the move of agents whose utility is computed
using respectively a stair-like function and an asymmetrically peaked function. Snapshots of
some of these stationary configurations are presented in Figure 1.7. To contrast the three
dynamic rules, these simulations have been performed using alternatively the strict BR, the
non-strict BR and the logit dynamic rule. Figures 1.5 and 1.6 clearly show that the two best-
response rules lead to a strong dependence of the final state on the initial configuration4.
For each simulation, we start both from a randomly chosen initial state or a totally seg-
3 And even though a red agent goes from time to time into the green area by mistake, because of the
asymmetry in the utility function, he will have a strong incentive to return to the red area, which he will do
very likely before a second red agent rejoins him in the green area.
4More precisely, in the case of a stair-like utility function, non-strict BR dynamics generally leads to
final configurations that do not depend on the initial configuration, as shown by Vinkovic & Kirman (2006).
However, using other utility functions, such as the asymmetrically-peaked one, cancels this effect (Figure
1.6), and one needs the logit rule to break the dependence on the initial state.
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Figure 1.6: Asymmetrically peaked utility function. Stationary values of the normalized similarity
index and of the normalized collective utility obtained by simulating the move of agents whose utility is
computed using a asymmetrically peaked function u(s) parametrized by m ≡ u(s = 1) varying from 0 to
1. We used a H = 8 continuous neighborhood description and the demographic parameters were fixed to
(N = 30, v = 10%, nR = 0.5). Simulations are started from random or segregated initial states.
regated initial state similar to the ones presented on fig 1.3b and e. In the case of the BR
dynamics, we wait until the system gets caught in a frozen state or until each agent is given
in average 1000 opportunities to move; we then repeated this procedure 200 times for each
set of parameters. Each corresponding point and error bar in figures 1.5 and 1.6 are the
mean values and the standard deviation of s∗ or U∗ over these 200 procedures. In the case
of the logit dynamics, we start from random and totally segregated configurations and wait
until both initial states converge to similar final configurations (i.e. similar s∗ or U∗ values).
In this case, error bars represent standard deviations in the final values, which correspond to
arbitrarily stopped simulations.
Stair-like utility function
In the case of the stair-like utility function, low values of sthr correspond to situations where
individuals are satisfied over a large range of neighborhood composition: as soon as the share
of same-color neighbors is above sthr, the maximum utility level is reached. Accordingly,
figure 1.5 shows that the normalized similarity index s∗, which represents the average fraction
of same-type neighbors, is small for values of the threshold lower than 0.2. It increases
however quite sharply when the threshold changes from 0.2 to 0.3. Consequently and as
could be expected, the collective utility level is at its maximum for 0 ≤ sthr ≤ 0.5: in
these cases and starting from a random configuration, it is quite easy for an agent to find
a neighborhood with at least sthr neighbors. By this move, this agent is not very likely to
decrease his neighbors’ utility level, as the chance of them seeing the share of like neighbors
to decrease below sthr is low. For large values of sthr, the index s∗ decreases dramatically,
which can be easily explained by the fact that agents prefer segregated local environments
only if they are highly segregated. If they can not find a neighborhood with a share of
same-type neighbors above sthr, the agents are indifferent about which location to choose.
This is a kind of coordination problem, as finding such environments starting from a random
configuration is not easy, although it is collectively desirable. Contrarily, it seems easier when
the threshold sthr is around 0.5 to find “by chance” neighborhoods which are slightly above
this value. In these cases, agents are both willing and able to find segregated neighborhoods.
This explains the rise in the segregation index, which is at its highest for sthr equal to 0.6 or
0.7. As far as the dynamic rule is concerned, it is worth noting that the removal of the inertia,
compared to the BR rule, increases the segregation level in all cases. By letting the agents
make mistakes, no-inertia rules allow to achieve higher segregation levels. In particular, for
sthr = 0.7, allowing moves which do not strictly improve the segregation experienced by the
agents permits the system to find configurations where the collective utility is higher because
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Figure 1.7: Left. Snapshots of stationary configurations obtained using stair-like utility functions, which
correspond to some of the results presented in fig 1.5. Right. Snapshots of stationary configurations obtained
using asymmetrically peaked utility functions, which correspond to some of the results presented in fig 1.6.
the average segregation level is far above the desired threshold.
Asymmetrically peaked utility function
The asymmetrically peaked utility function represents situations in which the agents prefer
mixed neighborhoods (with a strict preference as long as m < 1). Figure 1.6 shows a continu-
ous increase in average segregation with the rise of m: the stronger the asymmetry, the higher
the incentive to move from location below-50% of like-neighbors to locations above-50% of
like-neighbors. The collective utility level first decreases with a rise in m from 0 to 0.3: due to
the increase in s∗, the agents are less happy because they individually prefer perfectly mixed
neighborhoods. With the BR dynamic rules, collective utility rises with m if it is above 0.3:
the higher m, the lower the decrease in utility in segregated neighborhoods compared to per-
fectly mixed neighborhoods. However, adopting the logit rule with T = 0.1 leads to a jump
in the average segregation level for m going from 0.35 to 0.5. Here as in the stair-like utility
function, allowing agents to make some mistakes leads to form segregated neighborhoods,
which will afterwards be strictly preferred over environments where the agents are in minor-
ity. However, this formation of segregated configurations is accompanied by a decrease in
the average utility: for medium values of m, mixed configurations are still collectively much
more preferable to segregated ones. Collective utility increases when m increases further,
because agents, although they prefer mixed neighborhoods, favor then the majority status
over the minority status. At the end, when m = 1, the agents are indifferent between mixed
environments and environments with 100% of same-type neighbors. The outcome in this case
is a perfectly segregated configuration that allow agents to achieve the highest utility level.
1.4 Discussion
An important goal of Schelling-type models is to provide results concerning the determinants
of segregation. Such results are useful to derive some welfare and policy implications. Results
of the previous section give a large overview of the outcomes of the model depending on a
great variety of parameters (form of the utility function, values of the parameters governing
this function, dynamic rule). However, one can still wonder which are the general conditions
yielding to segregation. Suppose in particular that there is a benevolent planner able to
affect the agents’ preferences and that she aims at maximizing integration. What preferences
would she like them to have? In other words, what would be the kind of preferences, if any,
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that could avoid the segregative outcome?
To answer this question, it is worth relying not only on simulations, but also on analytical
results. To date, the existing analytical results of Schelling-type models are based on specific
hypotheses, as argued in the introduction of this paper. Our aim in Chapter 2 is to provide
a generic analytical ground to a Schelling-type model, that will enable us to tell, for a broad
family of utility functions, which configurations exist at equilibrium.
Furthermore, the gap between micro-motives and macro-behaviors underlined by Schelling
is the result of externalities: an agent who moves according only to his own interest creates
externalities since his move also affects the utilities of the agents living in the neighborhood
he leaves and in the neighborhood he arrives in. Classically, in economics, one can think
of introducing some kind of coordination between the agents to avoid the consequences of
these externalities, either by introducing a coordination mechanism between the agents, or by
imposing a taxation on individual moves. Pancs & Vriend (2007) consider the latter solutions
as follows: “[...] presuming that there is a social welfare case for integration (independent
of the specification of the individual preferences), could a migration subsidy or tax system
prevent segregation and implement integration? Although we do not explicitly analyze this
issue, our analysis suggests that a system consisting of rewards for integrating moves or
taxation of segregating moves might not work if it merely emulates the incentive structure
represented by the various utility functions analyzed in our paper.”
We analyze in chapter 3 these two kinds of coordination devices by means of simulations.
We will see that in certain cases, introducing coordination is actually sufficient to change the
basic model outcomes.
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Chapter 2
An analytically soluble model
2.1 Introduction
Schelling’s model was first recast within the framework of evolutionary game theory by Young
(1998) who analyzes a one-dimensional Schelling model. Later, Zhang (2004a) prolonged
this approach by analytically solving a two-dimensional segregation model in which one
category of agents is color-neutral while the other category has a utility function which is
always increasing in the number of same-color agents1. Zhang (2004b) studies the case of
an asymmetric peaked utility function within the same framework. However, Zhang (2004b)
relies on a particular context with no vacant locations, in which individuals’ moves in the
city occur when two agents agree on exchanging locations. This context allows an analytical
resolution of the model because each individual movement can be translated into the variation
of an aggregate-level function, called the potential function, that parallels the segregation
level. As stated by the author, “[the] kind of externality from social dynamics is made
transparent in the potential function of our model that relates segregation, a non-optimum
social outcome, to utility gains at the individual level.” However, the absence of vacant
locations in Zhang (2004b) implies that agents’ moves only occur when two agents agree to
do so, that is, if the sum of their utilities is positive. This condition is somewhat restrictive
and implies some kind of coordination between the agents, which is not present in the basic
Schelling’s model.
The present chapter goes a step further by proposing an analytical resolution of a more
general model with vacant cells and with general utility functions. We show that it is possi-
ble, in the context of a bounded neighborhood description, to define a large class of utility
functions for which each individual location choice can be translated into the variation of
an aggregate function that characterizes the segregation level in the city. To establish this
critical link between the individual move and the global characteristics of our system, our
key trick is to use bounded neighborhoods, which allows to reduce agents’ heterogeneity by
giving the same utility to all inhabitants sharing the same color and the same bounded neigh-
borhood. This ‘collectivisation’ of the individuals prevents any loss of information on the
global configuration change, allowing to keep track on how each individual move affects the
global configuration. Instead, when continuous neighborhoods are used, this information is
lost because the way a moving agent affects his past and new neighbors depends on factors
(their neighbors’ neighbors) that she does not take into account when moving. Therefore, it
is generally impossible to know how an individual move affects a function of the global config-
uration. Using bounded neighborhoods provides therefore a very general solution, thanks to
which it is possible to predict the long-term configurations of the city. Although the potential
function is not generally linked with the segregation level, the analysis in term of potential
function yields criteria allowing to predict the consequences of very different utility functions
1 Zhang (2004a) also considers an asymmetric peaked utility function but does not solve this case analyt-
ically.
17
in terms of segregation or integration.
As an example, Schelling’s original stair-like utility function leads to the well-known Dun-
can dissimilarity index. The potential functions corresponding to other well-known examples
of utility functions are also derived.
2.2 Framework
We place ourselves in a bounded neighborhood framework. The city is divided into a set
Q of blocks, each of which contains H + 1 locations (hence, the relation |Q|(H + 1) = N2
must hold). For a given configuration x ∈ X of the city, we denote by Rq(x) and Gq(x) the
number of red and green agents that live inside the block q ∈ Q. Taking into account that
some locations of each block may remain empty, the {Rq} and the {Gq} must thus verify :∑
q Rq = NR (2.1)∑
q Gq = NG (2.2)
(Rq, Gq) ∈ EH+1 ≡ {(R,G), 0 ≤ R+G ≤ H + 1} (2.3)
Without any loss of generality, we write the utility of an agent as:
u = uR(Rq − 1, Gq) for a red agent living in block q
u = uG(Rq, Gq − 1) for a green agent living in block q
The utility of an agent is thus a function of EH → R. Note that the choice of the input
variables of the uR and uG functions is consistent with the fact that an agent living in the
block q will have Rq − 1 red neighbors and Gq green neighbors if he is red and similarly Rq
red neighbors and Gq − 1 green neighbors if he is green.
2.3 Potential function
2.3.1 Definitions and properties
In game theory, a game is said to be a potential game if the incentive of all players to choose
their strategy can be expressed in one global function, which is called the potential function.
Games can be either ordinal or cardinal potential games. In cardinal games, the difference
in individual payoffs for each player from individually choosing one’s strategy ceteris paribus
has to have the same value as the difference in values for the potential function. In ordinal
games, only the signs of the differences have to be the same.
The concept of potential function was proposed by Monderer & Shapley (1996) in which
more formal definitions can be found. In our context, the definition of a potential function
takes the rather simple following form:
Definition
Let F : x ∈ X → F(x) ∈ R be an aggregate function describing each of the possible
configurations. By definition, F will be a (cardinal) potential function of our model if and
only if each gain in utility ∆u of a moving agent is equal to the variation ∆F that is induced
at the global level by the move of this agent. A cardinal potential function will thus verify:
F(y)−F(x) = ∆xyu with ∆xyu previously defined (section 1.2.2).
In our model, the main property of a potential function is to link the variation of a purely
individual function (the utility of the moving agent) to the variation of a global function
defined on the space X of all possible configurations. The fact that the knowledge of ∆u is
sufficient to say something at the global level is highly non-trivial since (for example) there
is no way to determine the externalities produced by the move of an agent - ie the variation
of the utility of his former and new neighbors - only by the knowledge of ∆u. The ensuing
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lemma points out even more the value of the potential function as an analytical tool.
Lemma 2
If F is a potential function of the system, then the stationary distribution Π for any config-
uration x can be written as
Π(x) =
eF(x)/T∑
z∈X eF(z)/T
(2.4)
It follows that for T → 0, the stationary configurations are those which maximize F .
The following proof follows the classical argument presented in Young (1998).
Let pi be the function defined as pi : X → [0, 1]; x → pi(x) = eF(x)/T /∑z eF(z)/T . The
first step of the proof consists in checking that pi satisfies the detailed balance condition:
pi(x)PTxy = pi(y)P
T
yx (2.5)
If x and y are two different and not communicating states, the relation 2.5 is trivially satisfied
since in this case PTxy = P
T
yx = 0. If x = y, the detailed balance condition is also trivially
verified. In the case where x 6= y and x and y are two communicating states, one has:
pi(x)PTxy = pi(x)γ
1
1 + e−∆xyu/T
= pi(x)γ
1
1 + e−(F(y)−F(x))/T
= pi(x)γ
eF(y)/T
eF(x)/T + eF(y)/T
= pi(y)γ
eF(x)/T
eF(x)/T + eF(y)/T
= pi(y)γ
1
1 + e−(F(x)−F(y))/T
= pi(y)γ
1
1 + e−∆yxu/T
= pi(y)PTyx
recalling that γ = 1/(NV (NR +NG)) = 1/(v(1− v)N4).
Hence the detailed balance condition is always verified and∑
x∈X
pi(x)PTxy =
∑
x∈X
pi(y)PTyx = pi(y)
∑
x∈X
PTyx = pi(y) · 1 = pi(y) , (2.6)
which defines pi as a stationary distribution of the process. Because the Markov chain is
finite and irreducible, it has a unique stationary distribution. Hence, for each state x,
Π(x) = pi(x) = eF(x)/T /
∑
z e
F(z)/T .
Define then XF as the subset of X of the states that strictly maximize the potential
function F :
XF = {y, ∀x ∈ X F(y) ≥ F(x)} (2.7)
The second part of the lemma can now be proved as follows: for two states x and y of
XF , we will have F(x) = F(y) and therefore Π(x)/Π(y) = e[F(x)−F(y)]/T = 1, which means
that two states that strictly maximize F are observed in the long run with the same proba-
bility; for two states x ∈ X \XF and y ∈ XF , we will have F(x) − F(y) ≤ 0 and therefore
Π(x)/Π(y) = e[F(x)−F(y)]/T → 0 as T → 0. This means that for T → 0, the probability to
observe a state that does not maximize the potential function F becomes in the long run
infinitesimally small 
In the case of finite values of the noise level (T > 0), it can be demonstrated using stan-
dard tools of statistical physics that the states which are the more probable to appear are
those which maximize F (x)+TS(x) where S(x) is an entropy-like global function taking into
account the number of ways of locating Rq red agents and Gq green agents in each block q
of the city (refer to Grauwin et al. (2009) for more precision).
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The potential function is hence a very powerful analytical tool. By establishing a relation
between individual changes in utility and a global characteristic of the city configuration, and
because stationary configurations can be defined as those maximizing the potential function,
this analysis will allow to qualify analytically stationary configurations. We would like in the
following to provide a more general analysis. Indeed, two questions remain at this step: given
any pair of utility functions (uR, uG), does a potential function exist and can we compute it?
Reciprocally, given a potential function, can we find a pair of utility functions (uR, uG) that
can be translated into this specific potential function?
2.3.2 Main result
Let us begin with some definitions.
Definition
Let U be the set of pairs of utility functions (uR, uG) that verify for all (R,G) ∈ EH the
condition:
uR(R,G)− uR(R,G+ 1) = uG(R,G)− uG(R+ 1, G) (2.8)
The condition 2.8 only imposes that if a block contains R+ 1 red agents and G+ 1 green
agents, the utility gain a red agent would achieve if a green agent left must be the same than
the utility gain a green would achieve if a red agent left. The results in the following apply
to pairs of utility functions verifying this condition. As we show below, this condition is not
strongly restrictive, which means that our approach can be applied to virtually all the usual
utility functions.
Definition
Let F be the set of aggregate functions of the form F(x) = ∑q∈Q F (Rq, Gq), where F is
an intermediate function defined on the set EH+1 of all possible numbers of red and green
agents that can be present in a block.
The main result of this chapter consists in the following claim:
Claim 1
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To each aggregate function F = ∑q∈Q F (Rq, Gq) ∈ F corresponds at leasta one pair (uR, uG)
of utility functions of U of which values can be expressed as:{
uR(R,G) = F (R+ 1, G)− F (R,G)
uG(R,G) = F (R,G+ 1)− F (R,G) (2.9)
Reciprocally, for each pair of utility function (uR, uG) of U, there exists oneb corresponding
potential function F[uR,uG] =
∑
q∈Q F[uR,uG](Rq, Gq) ∈ F which can be expressed through
the functional:
F[uR,uG](R,G) =
R−1∑
r=0
uR(r, 0) +
G−1∑
g=0
uG(R, g) (2.10)
=
R−1∑
r=0
uR(r,G) +
G−1∑
g=0
uG(0, g) (2.11)
where we use the convention that a sum is equal to zero when the index of its last term is
strictly inferior to that of its first term (which happens here in practice when either R = 0
or G = 0).
aSince the definition of the potential function makes only intervene its variation, F can be defined up to
an additive constant. Similarly, a utility function can also be defined up to a constant. All the formula in
this insert are written with the convention u(0, 0) = F (0, 0) = F (0, 1) = F (1, 0) = 0. For more details, see
the proof in appendix A.2.
bSame remark as before. Since F can be defined up to a constant, formally there exist more than one
corresponding potential function.
The complete proof of claim 1 is given in appendix A.2.1.
2.3.3 Interpretation
Condition 2.8 can be given two interpretations. In its original form, it says that there is
a symmetry in the externality generated by green agents on red agents and by red agents
on green agents: starting from a given neighborhood composition, the variation in utility
produced by the departure of an agent of the other type must be the same for the two
categories. Condition 2.8 can also be written as follows:
uR(R,G) + uG(R+ 1, G) = uG(R,G) + uR(R,G+ 1) (2.12)
which means that starting from any initial composition of a block, the sum of utilities of
a red agent and a green agent entering successively in this block is the same whatever the
order in which they enter. Both interpretations show that the value of function F in a given
neighborhood q does not depend on the particular path of events that lead to the composition
of this neighborhood. The same can be said of the sum of the F intermediate functions, that
is function F .
In other words, it is always possible to define the intermediate function F as corresponding
to the variation of utility of a moving agent. However, only a pair of utility functions verifying
condition 2.8 allows this function to be path-independent and therefore uniquely defined for
any given configuration. As Eq 2.10 shows, this intermediate component of the potential
function corresponds to the sum of utilities of the agents arriving in succession in the block.
This sum is calculated starting from an empty block, agents being introduced one by one,
first the red ones and then the green ones. As Eq 2.11 shows, the same sum is obtained if
green agents are introduced first and red agents after. More generally, thanks to the utility
functions verifying condition 2.8, this sum is independent of the precise order in which the
agents are introduced in each block.
F can therefore be interpreted as the sum of the incentives the agents had to move in
the neighborhood where they are located. Indeed, if x(t) denotes the state of the city at the
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iteration t, then the potential can be rewritten as
F(x(t))−F(x(0)) =
t∑
t′=1
∆x(t′−1)x(t′)u (2.13)
where ∆x(t′−1)x(t′)u = 0 by definition if no move happens at iteration t′ and where we can
take F(x(0)) = 0 since the potential is defined up to a constant. It could also be viewed as
the minimum utility level each agent would require to accept quitting its neighborhood. As
such, it represents, in the case T → 0, the stability of the configuration x: the higher the
potential function, the smaller the incentives for agents to move.
In summary, the main property of the potential function is that it reflects both the micro
and macro scale. On the one hand, F is an aggregate function which only depends on the
number Rq and Gq of red and green agents in each block. On the other hand, F also keeps
tracks of the individual level since it corresponds to a sum of individual moves. When the
stationary states are reached in the case T → 0, F is optimized, which means that no agent
can strictly improve her utility by moving.
It is finally important to note the difference between the potential F and the collective
utility U , which is the sum of the individual utilities experienced by the agents in a configu-
ration x. Whereas F represents the sum of the agents’ utilities at the time when they have
moved into their current location starting with a totally empty city (or are considered to have
done so), U represents the sum of the agents’ utilities once they are all settled. Hence, while
stationary configurations maximize F they do not necessarily (and the following examples
show that they generally not) maximize the collective utility.
2.4 Applications
2.4.1 Reexamination of an historical example: Schelling utility func-
tion and the Duncan index
Suppose that the agents compute their utility with Schelling’s utility function (which is equal
to 1 if their fraction of similar neighbors is superior or equal to 0.5, and equal to 0 otherwise).
This utility function can be expressed in terms of the number of red and green neighbors as
follows:
uR(R,G) = Θ(R−G) = 12(1 + |R+ 1−G| − |R−G|)
uG(R,G) = Θ(G−R) = 12(1 + |R− 1−G| − |R−G|) (2.14)
where Θ is the Heaviside function defined by: Θ(x) = 0 if x < 0 and Θ(x) = 1 if x ≥ 0.
It is easy to figure out that this particular pair of utility functions respects the condition
2.8, and is therefore in the set U. It is possible to compute the potential function rather
directly thanks to its interpretation (as the sum of the utility of the agents being introduced
one by one in the city, this sum being independent of the precise order of the introduction of
the agents) we presented in previous section. To compute the potential of a given configura-
tion x ≡ {Rq, Gq}, let us consider that we introduce in each block first the agents in majority
(ie the red ones if Rq > Gq, the green ones if Gq > Rq, either the red or the green ones if
Rq = Gq) and second the agents in minority. Each of the first agents has a utility of 1 as
he settles in the city (since his group is in majority in his block when he settles) while each
of the other agents has a zero utility when he settles (since his group is in minority when he
settles).2 Hence it is straightforward to write the potential as
2Notice that in this particular example, we do not use the convention u(0, 0) = 0. See appendix A.2.2 for
more details.
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F(x) = const+
∑
q∈Q
max(Rq, Gq)
= const+
∑
q∈Q
1
2
(
Rq +Gq + |Rq −Gq|
)
= const′ +
1
2
∑
q∈Q
|Rq −Gq|
One can verify that the same expression can be found using the relation 2.10 (see appendix
A.2.2), the computation being in this case more formal than what we present here.
This potential function has an expression well known to scientists working on segregation.
In the case where the total number of red and green agents in the city are equal (NR =
NG = N), this potential function is indeed linear to the Duncan & Duncan dissimilarity
index defined by D(x) = 12
∑
q |Rq/NR −Gq/NG| = 12N
∑
q |Rq −Gq|, one of the first index
of segregation that was proposed by (Duncan & Duncan, 1955), which is equal to 0 when
the composition of each block reflects exactly the composition at the city scale and 1 for
completely segregated states. To the best of our knowledge, an analytical connection between
the two “historical” works of Schelling and Duncan & Duncan on segregative phenomena such
as the one provided by our model has never been found before.
2.4.2 Potential function and collective utility
Generalizing (Zhang, 2004a)’s choice of utility functions, suppose that uR and uG are ex-
pressed as
uR(R,G) = aR+ bG
uG(R,G) = bR+ dG (2.15)
where a, b, d are constant parameters3. One can easily verify that this particular pair of
utility functions verifies the condition 2.8 and one can compute the corresponding potential
function:
F(x) = 1
2
∑
q
(aRq(Rq − 1) + dGq(Gq − 1) + 2bRqGq)
=
1
2
∑
q
(Rq[a(Rq − 1) + bGq] +Gq[d(Gq − 1) + bRq])
=
1
2
∑
q
(RquR(Rq − 1, Gq) +GquG(Rq, Gq − 1)
=
1
2
U(x) (2.16)
In this particular case, the potential function is thus proportional to the collective utility.
Reciprocally, one can verify (see proof in appendix A.2.3) that if we want the potential
function to be proportional to the collective utility, then the constant of proportionality is
necessarily 1/2 and the pair of the agents’ utility functions necessarily takes the form 2.15
(up to a constant).
With this choice of utility functions, claim 1 and lemma 2 ensure that for low values
of T , the stationary configuration will maximize the collective utility, but what about the
segregation level? One can guess that for a > b and d > b, the agents have strong preferences
3(Zhang, 2004a) took b = d = −1 and a ≥ −1, the utility also including a fixed income term which makes
it positive.
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Figure 2.1: Typical stationary configurations obtained by simulations for different values of
(adb). Top panel: for 2b− (a+ d) < 0, the system evolves towards segregated configurations where red and
green agents tends to live in different blocks. Bottom panel: for 2b−(a+d) > 0, the system evolves towards
mixed configurations where the number of red-green pairs of neighbors is maximized. From left to right:
the sign of a and d controls the tendency of red and green agent to prefer to live in dense or uncrowded areas.
The demographic parameters are (N = 20, v = 10%, nR = 0.5). Neighborhood size is fixed to H + 1 = 9 and
the level of noise is T = 0.1
for all-similar neighborhoods, leading to highly segregated patterns, but we would like to be
more specific. In order to achieve this goal, let us introduce
ρRG =
∑
q RqGq the number of red-green pairs of neighbors,
ρRV =
∑
q Rq(H + 1−Rq −Gq) the number of red-vacant pairs of neighbors and
ρGV =
∑
q Gq(H + 1−Rq −Gq) the number of green-vacant pairs of neighbors.
Starting from these expressions, one can rewrite the potential function corresponding to 2.15
as:
F(x) =
(
b− a+ d
2
)
ρRG(x)− a2ρRV (x)−
d
2
ρGV (x) (2.17)
This last form allows a convenient interpretation of the potential function. The term
proportional to ρRG gives a measure of the relative contact between the two groups, hence
the sign of the prefactor b − (a + d)/2 indicates whether mixed states (when positive) or
segregated states (when negative) are obtained at the global level. The terms proportional
to ρRV and ρGV give a measure of the likelihood to find a vacant location around red and
green agents. The prefactors a/2 and d/2 could hence be seen as a measure of what locations
an agent can afford in term of income (supposing that the price increases with the local
density). All these insights gained from the study of the potential function can be checked
by means of simulations (Fig 2.1).
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2.4.3 Review of some utility functions
Another useful way to describe the set U is to remark that it is composed of the pairs of
utility functions (uR, uG) which are written
uR(R,G) = ξR(R) +
G−1∑
g=0
ξ(R, g) (2.18)
uG(R,G) = ξG(G) +
R−1∑
r=0
ξ(r,G) (2.19)
where ξR and ξG are arbitrary functions of {0, 1, ..,H} → R and ξ an arbitrary function of
EH → R. With these notations, according to Eq. 2.10, the potential function can be written
as:4
F(x) =
∑
q
(Rq−1∑
r=0
ξR(r) +
Gq−1∑
g=0
ξG(g) +
Rq−1∑
r=0
Gq−1∑
g=0
ξ(r, g)
)
(2.20)
In the limit of a very low vacancy rate, there is no vacant cells in most of the blocks, ie in
these blocks the relation Rq+Gq = H+1 holds. Hence, one only needs one parameter among
(Rq, Gq, Vq) to define a utility function. Supposing that the utility of an agent only depends
on his number of similar neighbors is then sufficient to describe all possible cases. This can
simply be done by taking ξ ≡ 0 in Eq. 2.18 and Eq. 2.19, while keeping the functions ξR and
ξG independent and free. In other words, it is clear that in the limit of no vacant cells, each
agent arriving in a neighborhood receives a utility that is fully determined by the number of
like-neighbors. Therefore, the order in which the agents settle in the neighborhood does not
matter and the condition for having a potential function holds. The set U hence describes
all possible pairs of utility functions in the limit v → 0.
In the following, we place ourselves in the limit v → 0. We take ξ ≡ 0 and review three
pairs of utility function (ξR, ξG) that have been studied elsewhere (Pancs & Vriend, 2007).
We will see that the potential function provides microscopic criteria for global segregation or
for integration.
Figure 2.2: Utility functions studied in this section. a. Single-peaked utility function; b. Schelling’s
utility function; c. the “asymmetrically peaked” functions.
Single-peaked utility functions
First, we consider the single-peaked utility function presented on Fig 2.2a. Here agents are
driven exclusively by their obsession to a fixed number of similar neighbors S∗. The utility
functions are given by{
ξR(R) = 1 if R = R∗
ξR(R) = 0 otherwise
{
ξG(G) = 1 if G = G∗
ξG(G) = 0 otherwise
4Notice that on this last form, it is pretty obvious that the potential does not depend on the order of
arrival of the agents.
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and a corresponding potential function is
F(x) =
∑
q
(
Θ(Rq −R∗ − 1) + Θ(Gq −G∗ − 1)
)
(2.21)
We can then differentiate between the possible outcomes generated by a pair of single-
peaked utility functions. Suppose for example that the two populations are equally present
in the city (NR = NG), and that both populations have symmetric preferences (R∗ = G∗).
Remind that we placed ourselves in the limit v → 0 and hence that the relation Rq +Gq =
H + 1 holds for almost all blocks q. For all intents and purposes, the potential function can
thus be written F(x) '∑q (Θ(Rq −R∗ − 1) + Θ(H −R∗ −Rq)). Hence,
• if R∗ ≤ (H − 1)/2, it is possible to have both Rq ≥ R∗ + 1 and Rq ≤ H − R∗ in each
block, a situation which clearly maximizes the potential. All configurations x such that
these inequalities are satisfied in every block are equiprobable. The probability for a
block to contain Rq red agents and Gq green agents being proportional to the number
(H + 1)!/Rq!Gq! of ways of placing them, the distribution of the Rq in the stationary
states is a bell-like shaped curve restricted to R∗ + 1 ≤ Rq ≤ H −R∗ and maximal for
Rq = (H + 1)/2. The red agents living in a block containing R∗ + 1 red agents and
the green agents living in a block containing G∗ + 1 = H − R∗ green agents have a
utility of one, all the other agents have a zero utility. Hence both the mixity and the
collective utility increase with R∗. In the limit R∗ = G∗ = (H − 1)/2, the perfectly
mixed configurations are the only ones that maximize F and in those configurations
the collective utility is also maximized.
• if R∗ > (H − 1)/2, all configurations for which either Rq ≥ R∗ + 1 or Rq ≤ H − R∗
(these inequalities not being compatible anymore) in each block q of the city maximize
the potential and are equiprobable. In the stationary states, the distribution of the
Rq is always a bell-like shaped curve but restricted this time to Rq ≥ R∗ + 1 and
Rq ≤ H − R∗ and maximal for Rq = R∗ + 1 and Rq = H − R∗. For R∗ = (H + 1)/2,
each block always contain a majority group whose agents have a utility that depends
on their precise number while the utility of the minority group is always zero. Hence
the collective utility has dropped down compared to the R∗ = (H − 1)/2 case. As
R∗ increases, the mixity now decreases while in the same time the collective utility
increases. In the limit R∗ = G∗ = H, the completely segregated configurations are
the only ones that maximize F and in those configurations the collective utility is also
maximized.
The same kind of analysis allows to deduce the characteristics of the stationary states
in the R∗ 6= G∗ cases. What is interesting here is to notice that while maximal collective
utility occurs in two cases ( R∗ = (H−1)/2 with perfectly mixed configurations and R∗ = H
with completely segregated configurations), only one of these cases is stable with respect
to small changes in the agents’ preferences. Starting with the R∗ = (H − 1)/2 case, small
fluctuations in the agents preferences (them becoming slightly less tolerant) can induce a
sharp transition in U∗ (from 1 to 0.5), while the stationary configurations remain almost
unchanged. Imagining the preference of the unsatisfied agents can evolve, the simplest way
for them to increase their utility is by becoming less tolerant inducing a loop of increase of
segregation/decrease in tolerance/increase in utility. On the other hand, starting from the
R∗ = H case, small fluctuations in the agents preferences induce only a small change in U∗
and the simplest way for the unsatisfied agents to regain their utility is to come back to
R∗ = H.
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Stair-like functions
Second, we consider a stair-like utility function, defined here through the number (and not
the fraction5) of similar neighbors, presented on Fig 2.2b. The utility functions are given by{
ξR(R) = 0 if R < R∗
ξR(R) = 1 if R ≥ R∗
{
ξG(G) = 0 if G < G∗
ξG(G) = 1 if G ≥ G∗
and a corresponding potential function is
F(x) =
∑
q
(
(Rq −R∗)Θ(Rq −R∗ − 1) + (Gq −G∗)Θ(Gq −G∗ − 1)
)
(2.22)
We can again differentiate between the possible outcomes generated by a pair of stair-
like utility functions. Taking once again equal populations with symmetric preferences,
the potential function can also be reduced in the v → 0 limit case to the simpler form
F(x) '∑q ((Rq −R∗)Θ(Rq −R∗ − 1) + (H + 1−R∗ −Rq)Θ(H −R∗ −Rq)).
For all values of R∗, the configurations which maximize this potential function are those
for which either Rq = 0 or Rq = H + 1 in each block q of the city. The system hence ends
up in completely segregated configurations. Compared to the single-peaked utility functions
case, the asymmetry towards like-neighbors in the utility function is favorable to segregated
states and the normalized collective utility is always maximal in the stationary states.
Asymmetrically peaked functions
Finally, we consider an asymmetrically peaked utility function presented on Fig 2.2c. For
simplicity, we suppose that the number H of possible neighbors of an agent is odd. The
utility functions can thus be written as (S standing for either R or G){
ξS(S) = 2S/H if S ≤ (H − 1)/2
ξS(S) = m+ 2(1−m)(H − S)/H if S > (H − 1)/2
and a corresponding potential function can be written as F(x) = ∑q F (Rq, Gq) =∑
q
(
F˜ (Rq) + F˜ (Gq)
)
, where
F˜ (S) =
(
S − H − 1
2
)(
S − H + 1
2
)[ 1
H − 1Θ
(H + 1
2
− S)− 1−m
H + 1
Θ
(
S − H + 3
2
)]
(2.23)
This expression of the potential put forward the crucial role of the asymmetric parameter
m. Indeed, one can compare different repartitions of H + 1 red and H + 1 green agents in
two blocks of the city thanks to the potential function F . Taking x = Rq −Gq the difference
in the number of agents of the two categories in the two neighborhoods, the difference in the
potential function compared ceteris paribus to the even distribution of agents in these two
neighborhoods can be written:
∆F = F (H + 1
2
+ x,
H + 1
2
− x)+ F (H + 1
2
− x, H + 1
2
+ x
)− 2F (H + 1
2
,
H + 1
2
)
=
2
H2 − 1
(
m(x2 + x)(H − 1) + 2x2 − 2Hx) (2.24)
As could be expected, this expression increases with m, which means that a given seg-
regated configuration is more probable and stable as the asymmetry toward like-agents is
increased. It also increases with x, which means that for a given m a highly segregated block
is more probable than a scarcely segregated one. More importantly, a highly segregated block
5A pair of stair-like utility functions defined through the fraction of similar neighbors does not generally
verify condition 2.8, while it does when they are defined through the number of similar neighbors.
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will be more probable than a perfectly mixed one if and only if the relation 2.24 is positive
for x = (H + 1)/2, which can be rewritten as
m >
2
H + 3
(2.25)
Our analysis hence provides a microscopic criteria allowing to predict a global outcome.
For m > 2/(H + 3), complete segregated configurations will be obtained at the expense of
the collective utility and for m < 2/(H + 3), perfectly mixed configuration will be obtained.
These results hold of course in the limit of low noise (T → 0). It is remarkable that our
analytical model predicts here a critical value of the asymmetric parameter m that is quali-
tatively comparable to the critical value we obtained in the more classical model of chapter
1 (we obtained a critical value m ' 0.35 with continuous neighborhood, H = 8, a vacancy
rate v = 10% and a noise level T = 0.1, see Fig. 1.6). Our analytical results however depend
on the precise definition of the model. It can be shown that taking the peak of the utility
function to H/2 instead of (H − 1)/2 leads to a negative critical value of m. However, in all
those different models (analytical ones and simulated ones) the critical value of m converges
towards 0 as the size of the neighborhood H is increased.
2.5 Extensions
To this point, we have focused our attention on a formal version of a classical Schelling-
type segregation model. But our approach provides an analytical framework that allows to
investigate many extensions and to consider a broader range of issues than other classical
approaches. Some preliminary suggestion yet to be fully developed are presented in this
section.
2.5.1 Segregation by ethnic origin, income, and preferences for pub-
lic amenities
Until now, we have always implicitly supposed that the sole characteristic that the agents use
to evaluate a location is the composition of its neighborhood. The red and green labeling of
our two groups thus corresponds to two groups of different ethnic origin or two groups with
different average income level. Other determinants of residential location choice however ex-
ist and are not correlated to the ethnic origin or the social economic status. Indeed, Tiebout
(1956)’s analysis of the importance of the location of local public goods is perhaps the main
competitor of Schelling (1971) in terms of its influence on later work on neighborhood choice.
It is very easy to write versions of our model which take into account the agents’ public
good preferences while keeping the existence and properties of a potential function. Noting
for example A the set of all the public amenities (city center, supermarkets, schools, ...) and
di,a the distance between an agent i and an amenity a ∈ A, the utility of an agent i could be
rewritten in a general fashion as
ui(R,G) + u˜i({di,a}a∈A) (2.26)
and one could easily derive the more general form of the potential function
F(x) +
∑
i
u˜i({di,a}a∈A) (2.27)
This generalized approach could provide a means to correct one of the bias of our ana-
lytical model, namely the lack of heterogeneity between the agents. However, the extraction
of the properties of the stationary states from this condensate global function would become
quite challenging, as the dimension of the state variable of the system increases with the
number of added amenities.
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2.5.2 Taxation to sustain collective welfare
The basic concept at the center of a Schelling model is that of an agent deciding where to
move according solely to the benefit ∆u she would achieve if she was to move. Her move
affecting her past and new neighbors, an implicit consequence is that she could generate
externalities that amount to ∆U −∆u while moving.
Suppose now the existence of a benevolent planner who rewards positive externalities and
taxes negative externalities. A way to model the action of that hypothetic benevolent ruler
is to write the probability that a move happens as:
Pr{move} = 1
1 + e−
(
∆u+α(∆U−∆u)
)
/T
(2.28)
where 0 ≤ α ≤ 1 is a parameter controlling the tax level. The limit case α = 0 corresponds
to a standard Schelling model and the limit case α = 1 corresponding to a case where only
the interest of the collectivity as a whole is taken into account.
Following the path of the proofs developed in section 2.2, one can infer the stationary
distribution in the bounded neighborhood framework:
Π(x) =
e
(
(1−α)F(x)+αU(x)
)
/T∑
z e
(
(1−α)F(z)+αU(z)
)
/T
(2.29)
The potential function can thus in this context be generalized to (1 − α)F(x) + αU(x).
We already noted that the configurations maximizing F are not in general maximizing U and
could even in certain cases (asymmetrically peaked utility function) be very unfavorable to
U . In this context, the question of interest is to determine what level of tax α is necessary
or sufficient to break undesired stationary configurations obtained in the classical Schelling
model. Such questions are addressed analytically in another paper (Grauwin et al., 2009)
and by means of simulations in the next chapter.
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Chapter 3
Effects of coordination
3.1 Introduction
One of the most important features of Schelling-type models is that their dynamics is governed
by the agents’ individual preferences. In this context, a presumed condition for integration
to occur is that the agents have a preference for a mixed environment. But as we saw in
several examples in the previous chapters, that condition is often not a sufficient one, mainly
because mixed configurations are unstable with respect to fluctuations, whereas segregated
configurations are very stable.
The stability of the city configurations, and moreover the gaps between the agents’ micro-
motives and the emergent macro-behavior, are linked to the externalities generated by the
moving agents. This is particularly the case when the agents preference are given by the
asymmetrically peaked utility functions, the system ending in highly segregated configura-
tions whereas the agent’s main preference is for mixed neighborhoods. A way to solve the
integration issues in this case could thus be to focus on the welfare issues, ie to find some
mechanism to reduce the externalities generated by the agents’ movements.
A classical idea in economics to avoid the impact of the externalities generated by individ-
ual selfish moves is to impose a taxation equal to the externality his move generates. Such a
policy implemented by a central authority is known to lead to first-best equilibria, where the
collective utility reaches its highest possible value. We verify here in section 3.3. that this is
indeed the case in the context of Schelling’s model. We also investigate the impact of different
levels of taxes and we show that a tax equal to only one fifth of the generated externalities
is sufficient in certain cases to reduce consequently the gap created by the agents’ selfish
behavior. To the extent of our knowledge, this work has never been done in the context of
Schelling segregation models.
However, these tax policies are not easy to establish in practice since they require a very
accurate knowledge of the city at the local scale by the central authority. Such informa-
tion is rarely perfectly and costlessly available. Hence, the policies implemented by central
authorities correspond generally to mechanisms that can only reach second-best equilibria.
Recently, some papers have proposed to add some ‘second-best’ mechanisms in the original
Schelling model to reinforce the integrated configurations. Dokumaci & Sandholm (2007)
proposes to tax the agents proportionally to the density of population in their neighborhood.
The tax level depends on the ethnic origin of the agents, as might be the case under various
form of affirmative action. Barr & Tassier (2007) introduces additional social interactions
into the Schelling model by coupling it with a Prisoner’s Dilemma played with neighbors. In
both case however, the effect of the added mechanism could be reformulated in terms of a
redefinition of the agents’ utility function.
We propose in section 3.4 to investigate the effect of the introduction of a local coordi-
nation by vote of co-proprietors. That new coordination mechanism has the advantage of
remaining in the spirit of Schelling’s model, adding only individual decisions based on the
30
same utility as the moving agent, without any need of a central authority.
Before developing models with coordination or tax, we present in section 3.2. the standard
Schelling model which we will use afterwards as reference.
3.2 A standard model
3.2.1 Basic setup
In all the simulations presented in this chapter, the demographic parameters of the city are
fixed. The size of the city is set to N2 = 400, a good compromise between the necessity to
take a large value of N to avoid small city effects1 and the convenience to take a small value
of N to achieve short computation times. The number of agents of each group is fixed to
NR = NG = 180 and the vacancy rate is fixed to v = 10%. As usually assumed, we use
continuous neighborhoods, that is, the neighbors of an agent are the agents living on the
H nearest cells surrounding him. Unless otherwise stated, the neighborhood size is fixed to
H = 8.
In order to simplify our study, we will suppose that all the agents share the same “asym-
metrically peaked utility function” um(s), where s is the fraction of one’s similar neighbors
and 0 ≤ m ≤ 1; um is defined by:
u(s) = 2s for s ≤ 0.5
u(s) = m+ 2(1−m)(1− s) for s > 0.5
Figure 3.1: In our simulations, the agents all share the same utility function um(s). We explore the change
in behavior of the agents according to the value of the parameter m. Except for m = 1, the agents always
have a strict preference for perfectly mixed neighborhood. Except for m = 0, their utility function presents
an asymmetry: they prefer all-similar neighborhoods to all-dissimilar neighborhoods.
By varying the value of the parameter m, we will then be able to explore the responses
of our system to a whole family of utility functions. Our choice of working only with the
asymmetrically peaked utility function is driven by the observation we made in chapter 1
(which is supported by the analytical results of chapter 2): for m roughly superior to 0.3,
the asymmetry in favor of the all-similar neighborhood in these utility functions leads to
segregation patterns at the city scale at the cost of a low collective utility. This family of
utility functions is thus the perfect candidate for testing whether the introduction of any
type of coordination might allow to break segregative patterns and lead to more integrated
patterns in which the collective utility would be higher.
1Such as those emphasized by Singh et al. (2007).
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3.2.2 Dynamic rule
As explained before (section 1.2), in standard Schelling-type models agents move only to
satisfy their own interest. We suppose that the dynamic follows a logit behavioral rule: at
each iteration, an agent and a vacant cell are randomly chosen and the probability that this
picked agent moves in that vacant cell is written as:
Pr{move; WC} = 1
1 + e−∆u/T
(3.1)
where WC stands for “Without Coordination”. As showed in section 1.4, the logit dynamic
rule has the advantage to grasp more aspects of reality (taking into account idiosyncratic
amenities) and to lead the system to stationary results which are independent of the initial
configuration. This is why we prefer that kind of dynamics to a more standard “best response”
dynamic rule.
3.2.3 Simulations
We introduce the parameter τ as the average number of moves per agent. Considering the
demographic parameters we use in our simulations, an increment of 1 in τ corresponds to
(1 − v)N2 = 360 performed moves. In the simulations presented below, we use τ as a
chronological reference2.
First example
Figure 3.2: Evolution towards a highly segregated configuration starting from a random configuration
in the case of the WC rule. Top panel. Some snapshots of the evolution of the city for a noise level
T = 0.1; Bottom panel. Evolution with τ of the index of similarity and of the collective utility for different
simulations with different noise levels. The grey dots on the T = 0.1 curves correspond to the snapshots
presented on the top panel. m = 0.5.
We present on fig 3.2 a typical evolution of the city in the case where the agents move
without coordination, the level of noise being fixed to T = 0.1 and the parameter m to
2A more obvious choice of chronological reference could be the number t of simple iterations (i.e. the
number of attempted moves). Neither choice accounts for the proportion of accepted moves (whose cumulated
value is τ/t), whose instantaneous value depends on the values of the various parameters and on the state
of the system. Ideally, it may be interesting to follow this rate of “moving iterations” with the dynamic
evolution of the city.
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0.5. Starting from a random configuration, we observe the rapid formation of homogeneous
areas which slowly melt into one another leading to the emergence of a highly segregated
configuration where the city is divided into two uniform areas, each inhabited by only one
type of agent. The bottom panel of fig 3.2 shows that after a transition time, the city
enters a stationary phase in which the segregation index s∗ and the (normalized) collective
utility U∗ fluctuate with rather low amplitudes. Even though the agents’ preferences go to
mixed configurations and even though the agents are prompted to move in order to improve
their own utility, their moves lead to a highly segregated configuration at the city level
(the stationary value of s∗ is close to 0.8) in which most of the agents are far from being
fully satisfied (the stationary value of U∗ is close to 0.6). This evolution is similar to those
presented in Chapter 1.
Influence of the parameters m and T
Figure 3.3: Typical stationary configurations obtained with the WC dynamic rule for different
values of m and T .
The influence of the parameters m and T can be observed on Figs. 3.2 to 3.4. For high
values of T (T ≥ 0.5), the dynamic is essentially governed by the randomness introduced
in the logit. In the limit T  1, the agents are distributed uniformly in the corresponding
stationary configurations, which induces a similarity index equal to zero for all values of m.
The probability p(s) for an agent to have a fraction s of similar neighbors being independent
of m in the limit T  1, the collective utility can thus be written (the sums being taken on
all the discrete possible values of s):
U =
∑
s
p(s)u(s) = · · · = Um=0 +m
∑
s≥0.5
(2s− 1)p(s) (3.2)
The bilinear form of the asymmetrically peaked utility function induces the linear dependency
of the collective utility with m observed on fig 3.4 for high values of T . Indeed, there are
two parts in U∗ when T is large and the distribution of agents almost random: because
the distribution does not differ from the distribution when m = 0, agents have the same
“baseline” utility ; however, those who have more than half of same-type neighbors have a
higher utility level than in the m = 0 case, and the gap is linearly increasing in m.
For low values of T (roughly T ≤ 0.1), the results are similar to the ones we presented in
section 1.3.3 in chapter 1. The level of noise being low, the dynamic is governed mainly by its
deterministic part, i.e, the agents’ preferences. One can refer to section 1.3.3 for a detailed
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interpretation of the dependency of the results with m. What is interesting to notice here is
that for middle values of m (between m = 0.2 and m = 0.8) the final outcome for low values
of T is always worse from a welfare point of view than it is in a random distribution of the
agents. This observation clearly points out the deficiency with respect to social welfare of
the location mechanism.
The level of noise also has an effect on the fluctuations of s∗ and U∗ in the stationary
phase as can be observed on fig 3.2. While these fluctuations are rather low for T = 0.05,
their amplitude increases with T before reaching a saturation value. Finally, while further
studies would be necessary to characterize the influence of T on the time needed to reach the
stationary phase, one can infer from 3.2 that as T decreases, this transition time increases
(see lemma 1 in section 1.2.2).
Figure 3.4: Stationary mean values of the similarity index and of the collective utility as a
function of m, for different level of noise T . The error bars give the standard deviation of the fluctuations
of s∗ and U∗ once the system has reached its stationary phase. The mean value and standard deviation
are computed over 10 periods of the stationary phases (when the fluctuation are important, we use larger
temporal windows).
The next two sections present two different ways of introducing coordination in the model
in order to explore the robustness of the deficiency of the location mechanism with this lack
of coordination.
3.3 A partial coordination by taxation
3.3.1 Basic setup
The idea of introducing ’partial coordination’ is to take into account a fraction of the exter-
nality generated by a moving agent on all the affected agents, ie her past and potentially new
neighbors. A mechanism of this kind can be interpreted as the intervention of a benevolent
planner who taxes negative externalities and rewards positive externalities.
3.3.2 Dynamic rule: tax on the externalities
In our reference case (without coordination), an agent decides to move according solely to
the benefit ∆u he would achieve if he was to move. As a consequence from that move,
she could generate externalities that amount to ∆U − ∆u. According to our premise that
a benevolent planner would reward positive externalities and tax negative externalities, we
propose to write the probability that a move happens by modifying the WC dynamic rule as
follows:
Pr{move;PC} = 1
1 + e−
(
∆u+α(∆U−∆u)
)
/T
(3.3)
where PC stands for “Partial Coordination”. 0 ≤ α ≤ 1 is a parameter controlling the
tax level, the limit case α = 0 corresponding to the WC case and the limit case α = 1
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corresponding to a ’Global Coordination’ case where only the interest of the collectivity is
taken into account.
From an analytical point of view, these changes clearly do not affect the main property
of the Markov chain theory: there exists one unique stationary distribution and hence the
independence of the final configurations on the initial ones is still valid. For α = 1, the
probability to move involves only the global function U . It is pretty easy to figure out -
following the path developed in section 2.3.1 - that the stationary distribution can be written
as :
ΠPC,α=1(x) =
eU(x)/T∑
z∈X eU(z)/T
(3.4)
Hence, according to lemma 2, the configurations obtained in the limit T → 0 are those which
maximize the collective utility.
In section 2.5, we found an analytical expression of the stationary distribution for other
values of α in the context of a bounded neighborhood. For continuous neighborhoods, our
analytical approach is no longer valid. The reason can be stated quite simply : in the bounded
neighborhood case, the information used to calculate the utility difference achieved by the
moving agent (the initial and final densities) allows to calculate the difference of the global
utility. This is because the agent’s initial neighbors share the same neighborhood as him,
and therefore a utility difference that can be calculated, the same being true for the final
neighbors. Instead, in the continuous neighborhood, the global utility difference depends on
the neighbors of the neighbors of the moving agent. Indeed, the utility difference felt by a
neighbor of the moving agent depends on his own neighbors, most of which are not neighbors
of the moving agent. Lacking the analytical approach, one still needs to turn to simulations
in order to investigate the effects of the introduction of partial coordination.
3.3.3 Simulations
We present on Figs. 3.5 and 3.6 snapshots of typical stationary configurations along with
the corresponding values of s∗ and U∗ for different values of α and m. As previously stated,
the case α = 0 corresponds exactly to the WC case. For m ≤ 0.3, the preference for a mixed
neighborhood of the agent prevails (locally mixed configurations are observed) and the segre-
gation index is low. The dispersion in the distribution of neighborhoods’ composition induces
a level of mean utility around 0.75, which is just a bit better than what is obtained with a
random allocation of agents (see fig 3.4). For m ≥ 0.4, the asymmetry in the agents’ utility
function induces a higher stability of highly segregated states to which the system converges.
These segregated states are particularly harmful in terms of welfare for middle value of m
0.4 ≤ m ≤ 0.7.
Note first that adding coordination with α = 1 to the m = 0 case shifts the random
configuration to an ordered one: enhancing the utility level is possible only by achieving
s = 0.5 in every location. Note also that even if a tax in this case does not affect the value
of the similarity index, it allows to enhance welfare by clustering vacancies, diminishing the
number of agents that do not have s = 0.5 exactly. For intermediate values of m, increas-
ing α breaks segregation patterns. Figure 3.6 shows that even a tax equal to one fifth of
the generated externalities is enough to change the segregation level and to increase utility
for 0.4 ≤ m ≤ 0.7. Obviously, for high values of m, due to the form of the agents’ utility
function, a high utility level is obtained whatever the tax level. Still, the similarity index is
lower when coordination is introduced: changing α from 0.5 to 0.8 and then to 1 decreases s∗.
Economic theory predicts that optimality (a collective utility of 1) is obtained if a tax
equal to the generated externalities is implemented. For α = 1, this is what would be obtained
in the limit T = 0. Here, the collective utility is slightly inferior to 1 because of the finite value
of the noise (T = 0.1). Interestingly, a low level of taxation is able to significantly increase
welfare. A tentative explanation is that the number of affected agents being in general
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Figure 3.5: Snapshots of typical stationary configurations of the city for different values of α and
m. The introduction of partial coordination can destabilize the highly segregated configurations and leads to
configurations which present structured mixed patterns. T = 0.1 and H = 8.
greater than one, the variation in collective utility would on the average be greater than the
variation of the moving agent (|∆U |/|∆u| being in this hypothesis proportional to H). This
argument is in fact incorrect because, while the moving agent potentially undergoes a big
change of neighborhood (|∆u| ∼ 1), the neighborhoods of the affected agents only slightly
change (|∆U | ∼ H · 1/H ∼ 1). A possible explanation of why a low tax is sufficient is that
it is based on cumulative mechanisms similar to the ones that lead to segregation in the WC
case.
Figure 3.6: Stationary mean values of the similarity index and of the collective utility as a
function of m, for different tax level α, with the partial coordination dynamic rule. The error bars give the
standard deviation of the fluctuations of s∗ and U∗ once the system has reached its stationary phase. The
mean value and standard deviation are computed over 10 periods of the stationary phases. T = 0.1 and
H = 8.
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3.4 A local coordination by voting
3.4.1 Basic setup
We define the co-proprietors of an agent as the agents living on the h nearest cells surrounding
him. Here, h is a fixed integer which verifies h ≤ H. Co-proprietors represent in a stylized
way next-door neighbors or the people living in the same residential building whereas the
neighbors represent the people living in the same street or in the same district. Examples of
possible forms of neighborhoods and co-properties are shown below in Fig 3.7.
We introduce local coordination by taking into account the potential change of utility
Figure 3.7: Examples of neighborhood and co-property used in our simulations. A red agent
is located on the central cell. His co-property corresponds to the orange cells and his neighborhood to the
orange and white cells. From the left to the right, (H = 8, h = 4), (H = 24, h = 4) and (H = 44, h = 4).
of the co-proprietors of the vacant cell considered by the potential mover. In the following,
we will denote by C this set of agents. It seems more logical to introduce local coordination
through the potentially new co-proprietors (who have you take an admission exam) than
through the current co-proprietors (that you can quit on your free will). For mathematical
convenience, we will suppose that the probability that the move happens can be computed
as the product of the probability that the potential mover would like to move and the prob-
ability that the agents of C accept him. The ‘local’ nature of the implied coordination comes
from the fact that only a fraction of the agents who might be affected by the potential move
are consulted.
We propose here one dynamic rule to counterbalance the wish of the potential mover
by the opinion of his potentially new co-proprietors. Other mechanisms can of course be
imagined.
3.4.2 Dynamic rule: qualified vote of the co-proprietors
The simplest local coordination rule is that the potential mover needs the majority of the co-
proprietors to endorse his moving in. Let ∆ui be the variation of utility of the co-proprietor
i ∈ C if the move was to take place. We write the probability that the co-proprietor i votes
‘for’ the move:
Pr{i, ‘for’} = 1
1 + e−∆ui/T2
(3.5)
The logit form of this acceptation probability can be justified in the same way as the logit
for the moving agent (appendix A.1.1). The parameter T2 > 0 can then be interpreted as the
amplitude of a noise that represents in a stylized way the preferences of the co-proprietors
over any characteristics of the potential mover other than and not correlated to the group he
belongs to (marital status, number of children, profession, religion, friendship, etc...). Since
a co-proprietor does not move, the noise affecting him is different from the noise affecting a
moving agent : the arrival of a new neighbor does not change his position relatively to the
city center, the supermarket, his children’s school or any other amenities. Hence the level of
noise T2 is by nature very different from the level of noise T . We moreover argue that since
a co-proprietor deciding whether to accept or not a new neighbor is qualitatively subject to
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less characteristics other than the group membership (ie to less noise) than a moving agent,
it is realistic to suppose T2 ≤ T .
The move takes place with a probability:
Pr{move;LC} = 1
1 + e−∆u/T
Y
({ 1
1 + e−∆ui/T2
}
i∈C
)
(3.6)
where Y = 1, 1/2 or 0 if respectively more than half, exactly half or less than half of the
co-proprietors vote ‘for’ the move, and where LC stands for “Local Coordination”.
From an analytical point of view, the introduction of the vote of the co-proprietors does
not change the main property of our system: it can always be described as a Markov chain,
and since T2 > 0, every move still has a non-zero probability to happen. This ensures the
existence of one unique stationary distribution and hence the independence of the stationary
states with regards to the initial starting state.
3.4.3 Simulations
In the following, we limit our investigations by fixing the noise level T to 0.1.
First example
We present on fig 3.8 a typical evolution of the city in the case where the agents move accord-
ing to the local coordination rule by consulting before each move h = 4 out of H = 8 of their
potentially new co-proprietors. The level of noise (attached to the co-proprietors) is fixed to
T2 = 0.1 (in order to be comparable to the chosen value of T ) and the parameter m of the
utility function is fixed to 0.5. Starting from a highly segregated configuration, we observe
the disaggregation of the two large homogeneous areas into a much less segregated configu-
ration presenting more local patterns of segregation. This first simulation hence shows that
the introduction of a bit of local coordination can be sufficient to break undesired segregated
patterns and therefore, a fortiori, to prevent segregation to appear starting from a mixed
configuration.
The explanation of why local coordination works is quite simple. It corrects the default
of the WC mechanism by rendering highly segregated configurations less stable than before
since if a red agent goes by mistake into the green area, he will, compared to the WC case,
encourage a second red agent to join him. Hence the formation of nuclei is encouraged by
local coordination. A second kind of mechanism to get out of segregated patterns is the
advance of the frontier zone. On the opposite, the locally mixed patterns are more stable.
Indeed, once an integrated pattern is reached, the co-proprietors tend to prevent the moves
which would increase local segregation.
It remains to test the robustness and the limit of this results by varying the different
parameters.
Influence of the parameters T2 and m
The influence of the parameters T2 and m can be observed on Figs. 3.8 to 3.11. For high
values of T2, the co-proprietors decision whether to accept or not the moving agent is purely
random and the local coordination mechanism has no impact on the dynamics. Hence on
fig 3.9 the values of s∗ and U∗ are similar to their values in the ’without coordination’ case
for T2  1. On the contrary, when T2 is lowered, the local coordination mechanism allows
to break the segregation patterns more rapidly (according to the bottom panel of fig 3.8),
leading to mixed configurations presenting locally ordered patterns (according to left panel
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Figure 3.8: The introduction of local coordination destabilizes the highly segregated configurations and
leads to configurations which present locally mixed patterns. Top panel: some snapshots of the evolution
of the city for T2 = 0.1 and h = 4. Bottom panel: evolution with τ of the index of similarity and of
the collective utility, the grey dots on the T2 = 0.1 curves corresponding to the snapshots of the top panel.
T = 0.1 and m = 0.5.
of fig 3.11). Notice on Fig 3.9 that the impact of local coordination - in terms of welfare
issues - is more important for middle values of m (between 0.2 and 0.8), precisely the values
for which the WC is the most deficient when compared to random allocations.
Figure 3.9: Stationary mean values of the similarity index and of the collective utility as a
function of m, for different level of noise T2, with the qualified vote dynamic rule. The error bars give
the standard deviation of the fluctuations of s∗ and U∗ once the system has reached its stationary phase.
The mean value and standard deviation are computed over 10 periods of the stationary phases. The plots
corresponds to a neighborhood size H = 8, a co-properties size h = 4 and a noise level T = 0.1. The
black curve corresponds to ’Without Coordination’ simulations that have been performed using the same
parameters.
Influence of h/H
The results displayed on Fig 3.10 and on the right panel of Fig 3.11 correspond to simulations
where the moving agents consult h = 4 new co-proprietors out of H = 44 of their potentially
neighbors. Since the move of an agent can affect at most 2H agents (neighbors in the
departure and arrival locations), the LC mechanism is only taking care of h/2H ' 5% of the
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agents affected by the externalities generated by the moving agents3.
For T2 ≥ 10−2, the results are comparable to the previous one: even if the size of the
co-property is relatively less important, the LC mechanism still allows to break the segre-
gated patterns and lead to locally mixed and ordered patterns. The size H of an agent’s
neighborhood being greater than previously, the typical size of these ordered patterns is also
greater.
For T2 = 10−3 however, one can observe that U∗ is lower than in the T2 = 10−2 case (Fig
3.11), and that the normalized similarity s∗ is negative for m ≤ 0.9, meaning that the agents
have on the average less similar neighbors than dissimilar ones. The corresponding snapshots
of the stationary configurations on Fig 3.10 show that the system ends in stripe-like globally
ordered states. This result can be understood through the notion of externalities and lack
of coordination. Indeed, when h/H  1, we can separate the voting co-proprietors whose
neighborhood is close to the vacant cell envisaged by the moving agent and the neighbors
living on a further ring. The respective neighborhoods of these two kind of neighbors are not
spatially correlated, which means that the interest of these two kind of neighbors are clearly
different. There are hence three kind of agents at play: the moving one, the inner ring of
new neighbors (among which the voting agents belong) and all the other affected agents (the
outer ring of new neighbors and the former neighbors). For finite values of T and T2 → 0,
the interest of the second group is in fact the sole taken into account in the LC mechanism.
There is no effective coordination between all the involved agents, some externalities created
by the moves are not taken into account and the system gets away from welfare maximizing
states.
Figure 3.10: Stationary mean values of the similarity index and of the collective utility as
a function of m, for different level of noise T2, with the qualified vote dynamic rule. The error bars give
the standard deviation of the fluctuations of s∗ and U∗ once the system has reached its stationary phase.
The mean value and standard deviation are computed over 10 periods of the stationary phases. The plots
correspond to a neighborhood size H = 44, a co-properties size h = 4 and a noise level T = 0.1. The
black curve corresponds to ’Without Coordination’ simulations that have been performed using the same
parameters.
3.5 Discussion
The aim of the work presented in this chapter is to study the effects of the introduction of
coordination in a Schelling model. We showed here that introducing partial coordination
through a tax on the externalities generated by the individual move is sufficient to break the
gap between the agents’ micro-motives and the emergent macro behavior and therefore to
break undesired segregative patterns. Moreover, we showed that it is not necessary to tax all
the externalities to reduce it significantly. A tax equivalent to one fifth of the externalities
3In fact, since some of the potentially new neighbors share almost the same neighborhood than voting co-
proprietors, there are spatial correlations between the H potentially new neighbors. Hence the LC mechanism
takes effectively into account more than h/2H of the affected agents.
40
Figure 3.11: Snapshots of typical stationary configurations obtained with the “qualified vote”
dynamic rule for different values of m and T2. Left panel: the h = 4 new co-proprietors of a moving agent
out of the 2H = 16 agents he potentially affects by moving are consulted. Right panel: the h = 4 new
co-proprietors of a moving agent out of the 2H = 88 agents he affects by moving are consulted. Noise level:
T = 0.1.
might well be sufficient.
In a second mechanism, we introduced local coordination through a voting mechanism
which involves only individual decisions and does not require the intervention of a benevolent
central authority as in the tax mechanism. We show that in cases when the vote mechanism
allows to take into account the interest of a large enough part of the agents affected by a
move, this mechanism is sufficient to reduce significantly the above mentioned gap and reach
a high level of collective utility.
In regard to segregation issues, the introduction of coordination cannot break the seg-
regative pattern without the agents having a certain preference for mixed neighborhood.
Coordination is only a way to reinforce on the large scale the wishes of the agents on the
local scale: if they are intolerant, segregation will occur, if they are tolerant, integration may
occur. Another issue that is only partly addressed here are the typical times needed to break
the segregated configuration and particularly the influence of the initial configurations in this
matter. We leave that point to further studies.
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Conclusion
Overview of the paper
We gave in Chapter 1 an overview of the concepts at stake in Schelling models, namely neigh-
borhood description, individual preferences and dynamic rules. We particularly pointed out
the relative efficiency (in terms of statistical significance and reproducibility of the outcomes)
of the logit dynamic rule compared to a Best-Response dynamic rule.
In chapter 2, we used recent tools from evolutionary game theory to develop an analytical
resolution valid in a particular context, i.e. bounded neighborhoods and two homogeneous
groups of agents. This is a significant step forward compared to previous analytical work,
mostly limited to computer simulations. We showed that the stationary configurations ensu-
ing from the selfish individual moves of the agents maximize a potential function that can be
interpreted in terms of the sum of the agents’ utilities at the time when they have moved into
their current location starting with a totally empty city, that is in other words, the incentives
the agents had to move in the neighborhood where they are located. Thanks to this potential
function, we analyzed several versions of Schelling models with different utility functions. In
particular, when the agents’ utility function is Schelling’s original utility function (stair-like
function with a threshold at s = 0.5), the potential function becomes the Duncan and Dun-
can segregation index.
Finally, in chapter 3, we presented extended versions of Schelling-type models incorporat-
ing different kinds of coordination between the agents. More particularly, local coordination
through a vote mechanism, while remaining in the “individual decision” spirit of Schelling
model, is shown to be sufficient to reach stationary configurations with a significantly higher
collective utility than a standard Schelling model. We hope that such an individualistic based
coordination model can be seen as a valuable alternative to the coordination models presented
in the literature, mostly based on affirmative action policies (Dokumaci & Sandholm, 2007).
Explaining the emergence of segregation
We have verified, both by simulations and by analytical calculations, the paradoxical result
that has generated interest for Schelling’s model. While the dynamics is governed by agents
moving to improve their own utility, their moves lead to highly segregated configurations at
the city level in which most of the agents are far from being fully satisfied. Our paper shows
that asymmetry in the utility function - that is a slight taste for like-neighbors - and selfish
behavior are the two main ingredients of segregation
The externalities generated by selfish moves are the important ingredient hightlighted
in previous literature. Actually, as already argued by Zhang (2004b) and Pancs & Vriend
(2007), individual preferences for integrated environments may lead to segregated configu-
rations because location choice by an agent affects her neighbors’ utility. We stress why
this makes mixed neighborhoods unstable and segregated configurations very stable. The
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instability of mixed neighborhoods is particularily clear in the block configuration for the
asymmetrically peaked function. Starting with the Nash equilibrium of a perfectly mixed
neighborhood, there is a positive probability that an agent accepts a slight decrease of its
utility, and leaves this block. The agents of the same colour remaining in the block now have
a lower utility and are even more likely to leave. This creates an avalanche which empties the
block, as each move away further decreases the utility of the remaining agents. Conversely,
highly-segregated configurations are very stable. Indeed, once the city is divided into homo-
geneous areas, a red agent will have no incentive to go from the red area to the green one
(his utility dropping from 0.5 to 0).
As stated by Zhang (2004b): “although nobody likes complete segregation, the residential
pattern is very stable. Only moving across the color line by a considerable number of agents
could disturb the segregation equilibrium, but nobody has incentive to do so because it causes
a loss of [individual] utility. [...] Segregation is stable not because people like it, but because
any individual who wants to change the situation unilaterally will have to go across the color
line, which may not be the desirable thing to do from the individual’s perspective. The failure
of the system to escape complete segregation is similar to the phenomenon of “coordination
failure” studied by economists in many other contexts. It is the agents’ inability to move
simultaneously that make them stuck in a situation nobody likes...”
The most important element driving segregation is the asymmetry of the utility func-
tion. Symmetric functions do not lead to segregation. It is only if utility functions favor
a large-majority status over a small-minority status, that segregation is found in spite of a
strict preference for mixity, as in the asymmetrically peaked function. Beyond this particular
example, our analytical analysis gives a general rule in terms of sufficient conditions on the
utility functions for steady-state configurations to be segregated. This rule opens the path
for analyzing more carefully different utility functions and their relations to households’ pref-
erences.
Future work
One of the most interesting tracks for future work would certainly be to explore more thor-
oughly what drives the agents’ preferences regarding their neighbors’ attributes. Indeed, in
real life preferences regarding mixity seem influenced by individual past experiences as well
as social norms. Such an analysis could be done by coupling Schelling’s model with another
model describing the dynamic evolution of preferences. For example, one could introduce
heterogeneity in the agents’ preferences and allow them to evolve over time, taking into
account the individual’s past experiences and its neighbors’ preferences.
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Appendix A
Appendix
A.1 Additions to chapter 1
A.1.1 Justification of the logit rule
The logit rule can be explicitly derived within a random utility model. In this context, the
utility u˜ of an agent is composed of two terms: a deterministic term u which depends on his
neighborhood’s composition and a random term  which is introduced to take into account any
other characteristics of the location and its neighborhood which the agent may be sensitive
to (the proximity from the city center, school or supermarket, etc...). The random term 
is assumed to be independent both across agents and locations. Agent k’s total payoff on
location i is thus written as
u˜k,i = uk,i + Tk,i
The parameter T is a positive constant which determines the relative importance of the
random term. If T is close to 0, the random term is not important and can be neglected. If it is
close to infinity, the random term is very important and the neighborhood’s compositions do
not play any role. Here, neighborhood’s composition is supposed to be the main determinant
of agents’ actions : we restrict our analysis to the case of low values of T .
The actions of each agent being solely based on their own profit, the potential mover
will choose to move from location i to location j if and only if it increases his utility u˜, ie
iff uk,i + Tk,i < uk,j + Tk,j . Following (McFadden, 1974), we assume that the k,i are
independent and follow identical extreme value distribution whose cumulative distribution
function and probability distribution function are
F (x) = exp(−e−x), f(x) = exp(−x− e−x)
Then, noting ∆u = uk,j − uk,i the gain the potential mover would achieve if he was to
move and φ = e−,
Pr{move} = Pr{uk,i + Tk,i < uk,j + Tk,j} = Pr{k,i < ∆u/T + k,j}
=
∫ +∞
−∞
F (∆u/T + ) · f()d =
∫ +∞
−∞
exp(−e−∆u/T−) · exp(−− e−)d
=
∫ +∞
−∞
exp
(
− − e−(1 + e−∆u/T1)
)
d =
∫ +∞
0
e−φ(1+e
−∆u/T )dφ
= (1 + e−∆u/T )−1
∫ +∞
0
e−φdφ = (1 + e−∆u/T )−1 · 1
The probability that the potential mover chooses to move is thus determined by:
Pr{move} = 1
1 + e−∆u/T

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The random term  in the payoff function can alternatively be interpreted as a way to
model the agents’ bounded rationality: it may happen that an agent takes a utility-decreasing
move, either because he is making a mistake or because of a lack of information.
A.1.2 Proof of Lemma 1
For any two states x and y, let Pyx be the transition probability from state y to state x and tyx
the expected number of iterations for the system, starting from state y, to arrive at state x.
Starting from state y, let us assume 1 iteration has passed and examine the expected number
of additional time periods it takes for the system to arrive at state x. With probability Pyx
the system is already in x and it takes 0 additional time periods. With probability Pyk the
system is in state k 6= x, and it takes tkx periods to arrive at x. Therefore, tyx can be written
as tyx = 1+Pyx ·0+
∑
k 6= xPyktkx = 1+
∑
k 6= xPyktkx Multiply both sides of the equation
by the stationary probability Π(y) and sum over all states to obtain∑
y∈X
Π(y)tyx =
∑
y∈X
Π(y) +
∑
y∈X
∑
k 6= xΠ(y)Pyktkx
= 1 +
∑
k 6= xtkx
∑
y∈X
Π(y)Pyk = 1 +
∑
k 6= xtkxΠ(x)
This implies that 1 =
∑
y∈X Π(y)tyx−
∑
k 6=xmkxΠ(x) = Π(x)txx. It immediately follows
that Π(x) = 1/txx.
A.1.3 Robustness with the neighborhood size
Results presented on fig A.1 are similar to the ones presented on Fig 1.4, the difference being
that the neighborhood size is fixed here at H = 24 instead of H = 8.
Figure A.1: Typical stationary configurations obtained by simulations for different models. The demo-
graphic parameters are (N = 30, v = 10%, nR = 0.5). Neighborhood sizes are fixed to H = 24. Up: with a
continuous neighborhood description. Down: with a bounded neighborhood description. From left to right:
the agents compute their utility with some of the functions presented Fig 1.2. The level of noise is fixed to
T = 0.1
We verify once again that the qualitative behavior of the system does not depend on the
choice of neighborhood description. Another important fact is that the qualitative outcomes
presented here are the same than those for H = 8. We do not find any qualitative difference
for other values of H (not shown here), provided H  N2.
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A.2 Additions to chapter 2
A.2.1 Proof of Claim 1
indent Let us first prove the first part of claim 1, that is that any aggregate function
F = ∑q∈Q F (Rq, Gq) is a potential function that corresponds to (at least) one pair of utility
functions (uR, uG) of U.
Suppose that F = ∑q∈Q F (Rq, Gq) is a potential function of the game, where the in-
termediate function F is known. Let us assume that an agent is moving from a block 1,
characterized by the numbers (R1, G1) ∈ EH+1 of red and green agents that live in it, to a
block 2 characterized similarly by the numbers (R2, G2) ∈ EH of red and green agents that
live in it (since there must be at least one vacant location in block 2 for an agent to move
in it, we necessarily have R2 +G2 < H + 1). By definition, the utility variation of a moving
agent must be equal to the variation of F it induces. Hence :
• to cover the cases when the moving agent is a red one it is necessary that for all
(R1, G1) ∈ EH+1 with R1 ≥ 1,
uR(R2, G2) − uR(R1 − 1, G1) =
F (R2 + 1, G2) + F (R1 − 1, G1)− F (R2, G2)− F (R1, G1) (A.1)
• to cover the cases when the moving agent is a green one it is necessary that for all
(R1, G1) ∈ EH+1 with G1 ≥ 1,
uG(R2, G2) − uG(R1, G1 − 1) =
F (R2, G2 + 1) + F (R1, G1 − 1)− F (R2, G2)− F (R1, G1) (A.2)
Considering the case where R2 = G2 = 0, equations A.1 and A.2 can be rewritten so that
one finds that the utility functions uR and uG verify for all (R,G) ∈ EH :
uR(R,G)− uR(0, 0) = F (R+ 1, G)− F (R,G)− F (1, 0) + F (0, 0) (A.3)
uG(R,G)− uG(0, 0) = F (R,G+ 1)− F (R,G)− F (0, 1) + F (0, 0) (A.4)
These relations define (up to a constant u(0, 0)) the utility functions the agents necessarily
have if F = ∑q∈Q F (Rq, Gq) is a potential function of the game. It still remains to prove
that this pair of utility functions belongs to the set U. According to the relations A.3 and
A.4, one have for all (R,G) ∈ EH :
uR(R,G)− uR(R,G+ 1) =
(
F (R+ 1, G)− F (R,G))− (F (R+ 1, G+ 1)− F (R,G+ 1))
=
(
F (R,G+ 1)− F (R,G))− (F (R+ 1, G+ 1)− F (R+ 1, G))
= uG(R,G)− uG(R+ 1, G)
Hence the relation 2.8 holds, which means by definition that the pairs of utility functions
(uR, uG) defined by the relations A.3 and A.4 belongs to U.
Let us now prove the second part of claim 1, which is that to any pair of utility functions
(uR, uG) of U corresponds a potential function of the form F =
∑
q∈Q F (Rq, Gq).
Let (uR, uG) ∈ U be a pair of utility functions. Suppose that F (0, 0), F (0, 1) and F (1, 0)
are given and let us define recursively the function F on EH+1 by the following equations,
verified for all (R,G) ∈ EH :
F (R+ 1, G)− F (R,G) = F (1, 0)− F (0, 0) + uR(R,G)− uR(0, 0) (A.5)
F (R,G+ 1)− F (R,G) = F (0, 1) + F (0, 0) + uG(R,G)− uG(0, 0) (A.6)
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The most important thing to notice is that these two relations are consistent with each
other thanks to the condition 2.8 that links the two utility functions uR and uG. By summing
Eq. A.5 on R then Eq.A.6 on G, one then finds the following expression of the function F :
F (R,G)− F (0, 0) = R
(
F (1, 0)− F (0, 0)
)
+
R−1∑
r=0
(
uR(r, 0)− uR(0, 0)
)
+G
(
F (0, 1)− F (0, 0)
)
+
G−1∑
g=0
(
uG(R, g)− uG(0, 0)
)
or conversely by summing Eq. A.6 on G then Eq.A.5 on R,
F (R,G)− F (0, 0) = R
(
F (1, 0)− F (0, 0)
)
+
R−1∑
r=0
(
uR(r,G)− uR(0, 0)
)
+G
(
F (0, 1)− F (0, 0)
)
+
G−1∑
g=0
(
uG(0, g)− uG(0, 0)
)
Hence, since F = ∑q∈Q F (Rq, Gq) one obtains, after rearranging the different terms, a
symmetric expression of the potential:
F = |Q|F (0, 0) +NR
(
F (1, 0)− F (0, 0)− uR(0, 0)
)
+NG
(
F (0, 1)− F (0, 0)− uG(0, 0)
)
+
1
2
∑
q∈Q
[Rq−1∑
r=0
(
uR(r, 0) + uR(r,Gq)
)
+
Gq−1∑
g=0
(
uG(0, g) + uG(Rq, g)
)]
(A.7)
Since the potential can be chosen up to a constant, it is clear from the previous expression
that the choice of F (0, 0), F (0, 1), F (1, 0), uR(0, 0) and uG(0, 0) do not really matter. Hence
our choice to put them to zero to simplify the generic expressions of the potential given in
Eq. 2.10 and 2.11.
A.2.2 Calculation of a particular potential function
Suppose that the agents compute their utility with Schelling’s utility function (which is equal
to 1 if their fraction of similar neighbors is superior or equal to 0.5, and equal to 0 otherwise).
This utility function can be expressed in terms of the number of red and green neighbors as
follows:
uR(R,G) = Θ(R−G) = 12(1 + |R+ 1−G| − |R−G|)
uG(R,G) = Θ(G−R) = 12(1 + |R− 1−G| − |R−G|) (A.8)
where Θ is the Heaviside function defined by: Θ(x) = 0 if x < 0 and Θ(x) = 1 if x ≥ 0.
Notice that in this example (and in this example only) the convention u(0, 0) used in claim 1
is not respected. The form we choose to write Schelling’s utility function imposes uR(0, 0) =
uG(0, 0) = 1. It is easy to figure out that this particular pair of utility functions respect the
condition 2.8, and is therefore in the set U. Indeed,
uR(R,G)− uR(R,G+ 1) = Θ(R−G)−Θ(R−G− 1) =
 0− 0 = 0 if R ≤ G− 11− 0 = 1 if R = G1− 1 = 0 if R ≥ G+ 1
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and
uG(R,G)− uG(R+ 1, G) = Θ(G−R)−Θ(G−R− 1) =
 1− 1 = 0 if R ≤ G− 11− 0 = 1 if R = G0− 0 = 0 if R ≥ G+ 1
Hence the relation uR(R,G)− uR(R,G+ 1) = uG(R,G)− uG(R+ 1, G) is always verified.
To compute a corresponding potential function, one can refer to the general form of Eq.
A.7 (since we do not use the convention u(0, 0) = 0 in this partiucular example) which can
be written here as:
F = const+ 1
2
∑
q∈Q
[Rq−1∑
r=0
(
uR(r, 0) + uR(r,Gq)
)
+
Gq−1∑
g=0
(
uG(0, g) + uG(Rq, g)
)]
= const+
1
4
∑
q∈Q
[Rq−1∑
r=0
(
3 + |r + 1−Gq| − |r −Gq|
)
+
Gq−1∑
g=0
(
3 + |Rq − 1− g| − |Rq − g|
)]
= const+
1
4
∑
q∈Q
[(
3Rq + |Rq −Gq| −Gq
)
+
(
3Gq + |Rq −Gq| −Rq
)]
= const+
1
2
∑
q∈Q
(
Rq +Gq + |Rq −Gq|
)
= const+
1
2
(NR +NG) +
1
2
∑
q∈Q
|Rq −Gq|
= const′ +
1
2
∑
q∈Q
|Rq −Gq|
It is also possible to compute the potential function more directly thanks to the inter-
pretation we presented in section 2.3.3. The potential function corresponds to the sum of
the utility of the agents being introduced one by one in the city, this sum being independent
of the precise order of the introduction of the agents. To compute the potential of a given
configuration {Rq, Gq}, let’s consider that we introduce in each block first the agents in ma-
jority (ie the red ones if Rq > Gq, the green ones if Gq > Rq, either the red or the green ones
if Rq = Gq) and second the agents in minority. Each of the first agents has a utility of 1 as
he settles in the city (since his group is in majority in his block when he settles) while each
of the other agents has an zero utility when he settles (since his group is in minority when
he settles). Hence it is straightforward to write the potential as
F = const+
∑
q
max(Rq, Gq)
= const+
∑
q∈Q
1
2
(
Rq +Gq + |Rq −Gq|
)
= const′ +
1
2
∑
q∈Q
|Rq −Gq|
This first example illustrates the usefulness of the interpretation of the potential function
as the sum of the agents (introduced one by one) settling’s utilities. The computation of F
is indeed much easier and bears more meanings with the second method. To compute the
potential function corresponding to a given pair (uR, uG) of utility functions, it may be worth
to think ahead of a practical order of introduction of the agents.
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A.2.3 Relation between the potential function F and the collective
utility U
Let us suppose that (uR, uG) ∈ U, and that the potential function of the system can be
expressed as a linear function of the collective utility, ie F({Rq, Gq}) = λU({Rq, Gq}) + µ.
Since the potential function can be defined up to constant, we can take µ = 0. Writing the
utility functions under the form
uR(R,G) = ξR(R) +
G−1∑
g=0
ξ(R, g)
uG(R,G) = ξG(G) +
R−1∑
r=0
ξ(r,G)
introduced in Eq. 2.18 and 2.19, the relation of proportionality between the potential and
the collective utility can be written as∑
q
(Rq−1∑
r=0
ξR(r) +
Gq−1∑
g=0
ξG(g) +
Rq−1∑
r=0
Gq−1∑
g=0
ξ(r, g)
)
= λ
∑
q
(
RqξR(Rq − 1) +Rq
Gq−1∑
g=0
ξ(Rq − 1, g) +GqξG(Gq − 1) +Gq
Rq−1∑
r=0
ξ(r,Gq − 1)
)
Since this relation must hold for all {Rq, Gq}, it follows that that for all (R,G) ∈ EH ,
the following holds:
R−1∑
r=0
ξR(r) +
G−1∑
g=0
ξG(g) +
R−1∑
r=0
G−1∑
g=0
ξ(r, g)
= λ
(
RξR(R− 1) +R
G−1∑
g=0
ξ(R− 1, g) +GξG(G− 1) +G
R−1∑
r=0
ξ(r,G− 1)
)
(A.9)
Taking successively G = 0 and R = 0 in that last equation provides three independent
relations dissociating the three functions ξR, ξG and ξ:
∀R > 0, ∑R−1r=0 ξR(r) = λRξR(R− 1) (A.10)
∀G > 0, ∑G−1g=0 ξG(g) = λGξG(G− 1) (A.11)
∀(R,G),∈ EH
∑R−1
r=0
∑G−1
g=0
(
λξ(R− 1, g) + λξ(r,G− 1)− ξ(r, g)
)
= 0 (A.12)
Notice moreover that the convention u(0, 0) = 0 implies ξR(0) = ξG(0) = 0. Let us also
suppose ξR(1) = a 6= 0, ξG(1) = d 6= 0 and ξ(0, 0) = b. Starting from equations A.10 to A.12,
it is straightforward to prove recursively that
λ = 1/2
∀R > 0, ξR(R) = aR
∀G > 0, ξG(G) = dG
∀(R,G) ∈ EH ξ(R,G) = b
Hence the agents’ utility functions corresponds exactly to those introduced in Eq. 2.15:
uR(R,G) = aR+ bG
uG(R,G) = bR+ dG
The individual utilities are thus necessarily linear in the numbers of similar and dissimilar
neighbors in case the potential function F is proportional to the collective utility U 
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